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Summary
The budget reconciliation process is an optional procedure that operates as an
adjunct to the budget resolution process established by the Congressional Budget Act
of 1974.  The chief purpose of the reconciliation process is to enhance Congress’s
ability to change current law in order to bring revenue, spending, and debt-limit
levels into conformity with the policies of the annual budget resolution.
Reconciliation is a two-stage process.  First, reconciliation directives are
included in the budget resolution, instructing the appropriate committees to develop
legislation achieving the desired budgetary outcomes.  If the budget resolution
instructs more than one committee in a chamber, then the instructed committees
submit their legislative recommendations to their respective Budget Committees by
the deadline prescribed in the budget resolution; the Budget Committees incorporate
them into an omnibus budget reconciliation bill without making any substantive
revisions.  In cases where only one committee has been instructed, the process allows
that committee to report its reconciliation legislation directly to its parent chamber,
thus bypassing the Budget Committee.
The second step involves consideration of the resultant reconciliation legislation
by the House and Senate under expedited procedures.  Among other things, debate
in the Senate on any reconciliation measure is limited to 20 hours (and 10 hours on
a conference report) and amendments must be germane and not include extraneous
matter.  The House Rules Committee typically recommends a special rule for the
consideration of a reconciliation measure in the House that places restrictions on
debate time and the offering of amendments.
As an optional procedure, reconciliation has not been used in every year that the
congressional budget process has been in effect.  Beginning with the first use of
reconciliation by both the House and Senate in 1980, however, reconciliation has
been used in most years.  In three years, 1998 (for FY1999), 2002 (for FY2003), and
2004 (for FY2005), the House and Senate did not agree on a budget resolution.
Congress has sent the President 19 reconciliation acts over the years; 16 were signed
into law and three were vetoed (and the vetoes not overriden).
Following an introduction that provides an overview of the reconciliation
process and discusses its historical development, the report explains the process in
sections dealing with the underlying authorities, reconciliation directives in budget
resolutions, initial consideration of reconciliation measures in the House and Senate,
resolving House-Senate differences on reconciliation measures, and presidential
approval or disapproval of such measures.  The text of two relevant sections of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (Sections 310 and 313) is set forth in the
appendices, along with a list of other Congressional Research Service products
pertaining to reconciliation procedures.
This report will be updated as developments warrant.
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1 Titles I-IX of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-
344; July 12, 1974; 88 Stat. 297-339) are cited as the “Congressional Budget Act of 1974”;
Title X is cited as the “Impoundment Control Act of 1974.”  Both the Congressional Budget
Act of 1974 and the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 have been amended many times over
the years, and all references to them in this report are to the amended versions, unless
otherwise noted.  Sections of the acts dealing with congressional procedure are codified at
2 U.S.C. 621-692.
2 Beginning with the inception of the congressional budget process in 1975 (for FY1976),
the House and Senate have met this requirement every year except in 1998 (for FY1999),
2002 (for FY2003), and 2004 (for FY2005).  For background information on budget
resolutions, see:  CRS Report RL30297, Congressional Budget Resolutions:  Selected
Statistics and Information Guide, by Bill Heniff Jr.
3 The congressional budget process, and its enforcement procedures, are discussed in more
detail in CRS Report 98-721, Introduction to the Federal Budget Process, by Robert Keith
and Allen Schick.  Also, see CRS Report 97-865, Points of Order in the Congressional
Budget Process, by James V. Saturno.
The Budget Reconciliation Process:
House and Senate Procedures
Introduction
Overview of the Budget Reconciliation Process
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 established the congressional budget
process.1  Under the act, the House and Senate are required to adopt at least one
budget resolution each year.2  The budget resolution, which takes the form of a
concurrent resolution and is not sent to the President for his approval or veto, serves
as a congressional statement in broad terms regarding the appropriate revenue,
spending, and debt-limit policies, as well as a guide to the subsequent consideration
of legislation implementing such policies at agency and programmatic levels.  Budget
resolution policies are enforced through a variety of mechanisms, including points
of order.3  The House and Senate Budget Committees, which were created by the
1974 act, exercise exclusive jurisdiction over budget resolutions and are responsible
for monitoring their enforcement.
In developing a budget resolution, the House and Senate Budget Committees
use various sources of budgetary information and analysis, including baseline budget
projections of revenue, spending, and the deficit or surplus prepared by the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO).  A budget resolution typically reflects many
different assumptions regarding legislative action expected to occur during a session
that would cause revenue and spending levels to be changed from baseline amounts.
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4 Direct spending is provided mainly in substantive law under the jurisdiction of the
legislative committees, in contrast to discretionary spending, which is provided in annual
appropriations acts under the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees.  Most direct spending programs are entitlements, such as Social Security,
Medicare, federal civilian and military retirement, and unemployment compensation.
5 The use of omnibus legislation is not unique to the budget reconciliation process.  In the
case of most “omnibus” measures, however, the term is not used in the legislation’s title, as
is often done with respect to reconciliation measures.  During the past decade or two, the
terms “omnibus” or “consolidated omnibus” have been applied to some annual
appropriations acts; these measures have no connection to the reconciliation process.  (For
examples of the application of this term to annual appropriations acts, see CRS Report
RL32473, Omnibus Appropriations Acts:  Overview of Recent Practices, by Robert Keith.)
Most revenue and direct spending,4 however, occurs automatically each year under
permanent law; therefore, if the committees with jurisdiction over the revenue and
direct spending programs do not report legislation to carry out the budget resolution
policies by amending existing law, revenue and direct spending for these programs
likely will continue without change.
The budget reconciliation process is an optional procedure that operates as an
adjunct to the budget resolution process.  The chief purpose of the reconciliation
process is to enhance Congress’s ability to change current law in order to bring
revenue, spending, and debt-limit levels into conformity with the policies of the
budget resolution.  Accordingly, reconciliation can be a potent budget enforcement
tool for a large portion of the budget.
Reconciliation is a two-stage process.  First, reconciliation instructions are
included in the budget resolution, directing the appropriate committees to develop
legislation achieving the desired budgetary outcomes.  If the budget resolution
instructs more than one committee in a chamber, then the instructed committees
submit their legislative recommendations to their respective Budget Committees by
the deadline prescribed in the budget resolution; the Budget Committees incorporate
them into an omnibus budget reconciliation bill without making any substantive
revisions.5
The second step involves consideration of the resultant reconciliation legislation
by the House and Senate under expedited procedures.  Among other things, debate
in the Senate on any reconciliation measure is limited to 20 hours (and 10 hours on
a conference report) and amendments must be germane and not include extraneous
matter.  The House Rules Committee typically recommends a special rule for the
consideration of a reconciliation measure in the House that places restrictions on
debate time and the offering of amendments.
In cases where only one committee has been instructed, the process allows that
committee to report its reconciliation legislation directly to its parent chamber, thus
bypassing the Budget Committee.  In some years, budget resolutions included
reconciliation instructions that afforded the House and Senate the option of
considering two or more different reconciliation bills.  Once the reconciliation
legislation called for in the budget resolution has been approved or vetoed by the
President, the process is concluded; Congress cannot develop another reconciliation
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6 See CRS Report RL30714, Congressional Action on Revenue and Debt Reconciliation
Measures in 2000, by Robert Keith.
7 On December 15, 1975, the Senate considered, amended, and passed H.R. 5559, the
Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975, which reduced revenues by about $6.4 billion pursuant
to a directive in the second budget resolution for FY1976.  The measure was not regarded
as a reconciliation bill when it was considered by the House, but it was considered under
reconciliation procedures in the Senate.  President Gerald Ford vetoed the measure later in
the year and the House sustained his veto.  See the remarks of Senator Russell Long and the
presiding officer, on page 40540, and the remarks of Senator Edmund Muskie and others,
on pages 40544-40550, in the Congressional Record, vol. 121, Dec. 15, 1975, regarding the
status of H.R. 5559 as a reconciliation bill.
bill in the wake of a veto without first adopting another budget resolution containing
reconciliation instructions.
As an optional procedure, reconciliation has not been used in every year that the
congressional budget process has been in effect.  Beginning with the first use of
reconciliation by both the House and Senate in 1980, however, reconciliation has
been used in most years.  (In three years, 1998 (for FY1999), 2002 (for FY2003), and
2004 (for FY2005), the House and Senate did not agree on a budget resolution.)
Congress has sent the President 19 reconciliation acts over the years; 16 were signed
into law and three were vetoed (and the vetoes not overriden).  Table 1 provides a
list of these 19 reconciliation acts.
Not every reconciliation measure considered by one chamber has been
considered by the other chamber, or been regarded as a reconciliation measure when
considered by the other chamber.  In 2000, for example, the House considered and
passed several reconciliation measures, but they were not considered by the Senate.6
In 1976, the Senate considered a House-passed revenue bill under reconciliation
procedures, although the measure had not been considered as a reconciliation bill in
the House; the bill later was vetoed.7   Conversely, in 1984, the House and Senate
agreed to deficit-reduction legislation that had been considered as a reconciliation bill
by the House but not the Senate; the bill, the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, was
signed into law by President Ronald Reagan (P.L. 98-369) but was not designated as
a reconciliation measure.
Historical Development
The budget reconciliation process reflects a complex set of rules, procedures,
and practices employed by the House and Senate.  Like other complex processes of
the House and Senate, such as the annual appropriations process, the reconciliation
process has been marked by significant change over time.  The House and Senate
have adapted reconciliation procedures to fit changing political and budgetary
circumstances.
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Table 1.  Reconciliation Resolutions and Resultant




Resolution Resultant Reconciliation Act(s)
Date
Enacted
1981 H.Con.Res. 307 Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980
(P.L. 96-499)
12-05-80
















1986 S.Con.Res. 32 Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985
(P.L. 99-272)
04-07-86
























1997 H.Con.Res. 178 Personal Responsibility and Work







Resolution Resultant Reconciliation Act(s)
Date
Enacted
1998 H.Con.Res. 84 Balanced Budget Act of 1997
(P.L. 105-33)
08-05-97
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
(P.L. 105-34)
08-05-97









2002 H.Con.Res. 83 Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001
(P.L. 107-16)
06-07-01




Source:  Prepared by the Congressional Research Service.
The framers of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 anticipated that changes
might be made from time to time in the budget resolution and reconciliation
processes that it established.  In an effort to provide limited procedural flexibility, the
act contains a provision referred to as the “elastic clause.”  Originally framed as
Section 301(b)(2), the elastic clause authorized the House and Senate to include in
a budget resolution, at their discretion, “any other procedure which is considered
appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Act.”  The clause later was redesignated
as Section 301(b)(4) and revised to read:
The concurrent resolution on the budget may — ... (4) set forth such other
matters, and require such other procedures, relating to the budget, as may be
appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Act. 
The House and Senate have used authority under the elastic clause to modify
reconciliation procedures over time in many significant ways, including advancing
the use of reconciliation to the spring budget resolution and extending the
reconciliation time frame from one year to multiple years.  While some innovations
in reconciliation procedure were dropped, others persisted and eventually were
incorporated into the 1974 act as required elements of reconciliation procedure.
Two of the most significant changes in reconciliation procedure involved
advancing its use to the spring budget resolution and extending its time frame from
one year to multiple years (paralleling the changes in budget resolution scheduling
and time frame).  As originally framed, the 1974 act required the adoption of two
budget resolutions each year.  The first budget resolution, to be adopted in the spring,
set advisory budget levels for the upcoming fiscal year.  The second budget
resolution, to be adopted on September 15, just before the start of the new fiscal year
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on October 1, set binding budget levels for the year.  Reconciliation was established
as an adjunct to the adoption of the second budget resolution.  Congress and the
President could use reconciliation procedures to quickly make any adjustments in
existing law or pending legislation that were required to achieve budget policies as
they changed between the adoption of the spring and fall budget resolutions.  Action
on any required reconciliation legislation was expected to be completed by
September 25.
In the early 1980s, the House and Senate abandoned the practice of adopting a
second budget resolution, choosing instead to adopt a single budget resolution in the
spring of each year (although the schedule often slipped, sometimes markedly).  This
change in practice formally was incorporated into the 1974 act by the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Title II of P.L. 99-177;
December 12, 1985; 99 Stat. 1037-1101).
The growing prominence of the spring budget resolution was indicated by the
decision in 1980 to use it to initiate reconciliation procedures for FY1981.
Reconciliation procedures were used again the following year as an adjunct to the
adoption of the FY1982 budget resolution in the spring, but the budget resolution and
reconciliation time frame was extended to three years, FY1982-FY1984 (although
figures for the latter two years were considered to be “planning” levels).  These
changes occurred for several reasons, including the belief that an advancement in the
reconciliation schedule was needed to allow committees more time to develop their
reconciliation recommendations, and to allow the House and Senate more time to
consider them on the floor and reconcile their differences in conference, and that an
extended time frame would promote more effective and lasting changes in budgetary
policy while discouraging evasions of enforcement.
In addition to the changes made with respect to the timing and scheduling of
reconciliation, the 1974 act has been amended to bar in the Senate the inclusion of
extraneous matter in reconciliation legislation (see later discussion of Section 313 of
the act, known as the “Byrd rule”).  Although Section 313 operates as a rule of the
Senate, it has also dramatically affected the development of reconciliation legislation
in the House and, at times, been a source of friction between the two chambers.
Other significant changes in reconciliation practice have derived from the
changing political and budgetary environment, or changes in precedent,  and have not
relied upon the elastic clause.  Initial actions under reconciliation, for example,
focused on deficit-reduction efforts.  Consequently, the procedures were employed
to achieve spending reductions and revenue increases on a net basis.  In the latter part
of the 1990s, particularly when large surpluses emerged in the federal budget for the
first time in decades, the focus of reconciliation action was shifted to reducing
revenues, which continued into the 2000s.  Most recently, for FY2006, reconciliation
directives entail reductions in both revenues and spending.
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Underlying Authorities of the Reconciliation
Process
The principal authorities underlying the reconciliation process are set forth in
two key sections of Title III (“Congressional Budget Process”) of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974.  Section 310 (2 U.S.C. 641) establishes the basic reconciliation
procedures, and Section 313 (2 U.S.C. 644) establishes a Senate rule aimed at
preventing the inclusion of extraneous matter in reconciliation legislation.  The text
of Section 310 and Section 313 is provided in Appendix A and Appendix B,
respectively.
In addition, other provisions in Title III have a bearing on the reconciliation
process.  Section 300 (2. U.S.C. 631), for example, lays down the timetable of the
congressional budget process, indicating the Congress should complete action on any
required reconciliation legislation by June 15 during a session.
Section 301 (2 U.S.C. 632) contains a provision authorizing the inclusion in a
budget resolution of reconciliation directives (in subsection (b)(2)), a deferred
enrollment procedure to used in connection with reconciliation (in subsection (b)(3)),
and other appropriate “matters” and “procedures” under the elastic clause (in
subsection (b)(4)).
Section 305 (2 U.S.C. 636) sets forth, in subsection (b), Senate procedures for
the consideration of budget resolutions, which, by virtue of a reference in Section
310(e), also apply to the consideration of reconciliation measures (except for the time
limit on debate).
Points of order pertaining to the enforcement of timing requirements,
substantive budget resolution policies, and the jurisdiction of the House and Senate
Budget Committees, that could apply to the consideration of reconciliation measures,
are found in Sections 302, 303, and 311.  Additional points of order that could apply
to reconciliation measures, dealing with budgetary legislation not subject to
appropriations and unfunded mandates, are set forth in Title IV of the act.  Finally,
Section 904 (2 U.S.C. 621 note) imposes a three-fifths vote requirement on waivers
(and appeals of the ruling of the chair) with respect to certain points of order under
the act.
Section 310 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974
Section 310(a) of the 1974 act provides for the inclusion of reconciliation
directives in a budget resolution.  The directives shall, “to the extent necessary to
effectuate the provisions and requirements of such resolution,” specify the total
amounts by which spending, revenues, the public debt limit, or a combination of
these elements are to be changed.  The directives take the form of instructions to each
appropriate committee to make changes in the laws under its jurisdiction to achieve
the specified budgetary results.
Under Section 310(b), when only one committee in the House or Senate is
subject to reconciliation directives, it reports its recommendations directly to its
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chamber.  When two or more committees in the House or Senate receive
reconciliation instructions, each committee submits its recommendations to its
respective Budget Committee.  The Budget Committee incorporates the
recommendations of all of the instructed committees, “without any substantive
revision,” into an omnibus measure, which it then reports to its chamber.
The subsection refers to a reconciliation resolution, which is a concurrent
resolution directing the Clerk of the House or the Secretary of the Senate to make
changes in legislation that has not yet been enrolled.  A reconciliation resolution is
intended to be used with a “deferred enrollment” procedure (see discussion below),
but the House and Senate instead have always used reconciliation bills.
Section 310(c), known informally as the “fungibility rule,” grants some
flexibility to committees subject to reconciliation directives pertaining to both
spending and revenues.  This provision applies principally to the House Ways and
Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee because they exercise
jurisdiction in their chambers over tax legislation generally; some other committees
exercise jurisdiction over matters, such as certain fees, involving budgetary
transactions that are treated as revenues.  In essence, the fungibility rule deems either
committee to be in compliance with its reconciliation directives if its recommended
legislation does not cause either the spending changes or the revenue changes to
exceed or fall below its instruction by more than 20% of the sum of the two types of
changes, and the total amount of changes recommended is not less than the total
amount of changes that were directed.
Section 310(d) imposes a requirement in the House and Senate that amendments
be deficit neutral, but suspends the requirement if a declaration of war is in effect.
The subsection provides that, in the Senate, a motion to strike always is in order,
notwithstanding the deficit-neutrality requirement.  Further, the subsection authorizes
the House Rules Committee to make in order amendments to achieve compliance
with the reconciliation instructions in the event one or more of the instructed
committees fail to submit recommendations.
Senate procedures for the consideration of budget resolutions are made
applicable to the consideration of reconciliation measures by Section 310(e), except
that the 50-hour debate limit applicable to budget resolutions is reduced to a 20-hour
limit for reconciliation bills.
Section 310(f) is intended to enforce in the House the June 15 deadline for
completing action on reconciliation legislation (as indicated in the timetable in
Section 300).  It does so by barring the consideration in July of an adjournment
resolution providing for the traditional August recess if the House has not completed
action.  There is no comparable provision in the act for the Senate.
Finally, Section 310(g) prohibits the consideration of any reconciliation
measure, including a special reconciliation measure under Section 258C of the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (see discussion below),
that contains recommendations with respect to the Social Security program.
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8 See Section 7 in the conference report, Second Concurrent Resolution on the Budget —
Fiscal Year 1981 (to accompany H.Con.Res. 448), H.Rept. 96-1469, Nov. 19, 1980, p. 9.
Section 313 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974
Section 313 of the 1974 act is informally known as the “Byrd rule,” after its
chief sponsor, Senator Robert C. Byrd.  The Byrd rule originated on October 24,
1985, as Amendment No. 878 (as modified) to S. 1730, the Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA) of 1985.  The Senate adopted the amendment
by a vote of 96-0.  In this form, the Byrd rule applied to initial Senate consideration
of reconciliation measures, but a short while later its coverage was extended to
conference reports.
Senator Byrd explained that the basic purposes of the amendment were to
protect the effectiveness of the reconciliation process (by excluding extraneous
matter that often provoked controversy without aiding deficit reduction efforts) and
to preserve the deliberative character of the Senate (by excluding from consideration
under expedited procedures legislative matters not central to deficit reduction that
should be debated under regular procedures).
The rule achieves its purposes by defining six categories of extraneous matter
in reconciliation legislation, and several exceptions thereto, and providing points of
order against any such matter.  The Byrd rule, and its operation, is discussed in more
detail in the section of this report dealing with “Initial Consideration in the Senate.”
During the first five years that the Byrd rule was in effect, from late 1985 until
late 1990, it consisted of two separate components: (1) a provision in statute applying
to initial Senate consideration of reconciliation measures; and (2) a Senate resolution
extending application of portions of the statutory provision to conference reports and
amendments between the two chambers.  Several modifications were made to the
Byrd rule in 1986 and 1987, including extending its expiration date from January 2,
1987, to January 2, 1988, and then to September 30, 1992, but the two separate
components of the rule were preserved.  In 1990, these components were merged
together and made permanent when they were incorporated into the 1974 act as
Section 313.  There have been no further changes in the Byrd rule since 1990.
Procedural Provisions in Budget Resolutions
Pursuant to authority granted in Section 301(b) of the 1974 act, including the
elastic clause, the House and Senate have, on occasion, included procedural
provisions in budget resolutions that affect the reconciliation process.  Several
examples are discussed below.
In 1980, the second budget resolution for FY1981 contained a bar against House
or Senate consideration of a resolution providing for sine die adjournment of either
chamber “unless action has been completed on H.R. 7765, the Omnibus
Reconciliation Act of 1980,” which had been developed in response to reconciliation
directives in the first budget resolution for FY1981.8
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9 See Section 6 in the conference report, Concurrent Resolution on the Budget — Fiscal
Year 1988 (to accompany H.Con.Res. 93), H.Rept. 100-175, June 22, 1987, p. 17.  The
provision referenced the Byrd rule as it existed at that time (i.e., Section 20001 of the
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11 For more information on the Senate’s PAYGO rule, see CRS Report RL31943, Budget
Enforcement Procedures:  Senate’s Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) Rule, by Bill Heniff Jr., and
CRS Report RL32835, PAYGO Rules for Budget Enforcement in the House and Senate, by
Robert Keith and Bill Heniff Jr.
In 1987, a provision in the FY1988 budget resolution declared that any
reconciliation recommendations developed by the House Ways and Means
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee pertaining to the establishment of a
special Deficit Reduction Account would not be considered extraneous matter under
the Byrd rule.9
Most recently, the FY2006 budget resolution included a procedural provision
applying a three-fifths vote requirement to waivers and appeals of points of order
dealing with unfunded mandates and the consideration of certain measures prior to
passage of a budget resolution, but provided that the change not apply in the case of
reconciliation legislation.10
In 1993, the Senate established a “pay-as-you-go” (PAYGO) rule as part of the
FY1994 budget resolution.  The rule, which has been modified several times and
extended through September 30, 1998, was not part of the statutory PAYGO
requirement in effect from FY1992-FY2002 (see discussion below).
The Senate’s PAYGO rule generally prohibits the consideration of direct
spending and revenue legislation that is projected to increase (or cause) an on-budget
deficit in any one of three time periods:  the first year, the first five years, and the
second five years covered by the most recently adopted budget resolution.  Any
increase in direct spending or reduction in revenues resulting from such legislation
must be offset by an equivalent amount of direct spending cuts, tax increases, or a
combination of the two. Without an offset, such legislation would require the
approval of at least 60 Senators to waive the rule and be considered on the Senate
floor.  An exception is made for revenue or spending legislation assumed in the
budget resolution levels.11
Prior budget resolutions containing reconciliation directives explicitly exempted
reconciliation legislation from the Senate’s PAYGO rule; reconciliation legislation
also was exempted by virtue of being assumed in budget resolution levels.
Section 301(b)(3) of the 1974 act authorizes an optional “deferred enrollment”
procedure. Under the procedure, if reconciliation is triggered by the budget
resolution, all or certain spending bills (i.e., bills providing new budget authority or
new entitlement authority) for the upcoming fiscal year that have passed the House
and Senate may be held at the desk rather than being enrolled.  This affords the
House and Senate an opportunity, through a reconciliation resolution, to direct the
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Clerk of the House or the Secretary of the Senate to make changes in the enrollment
of pending legislation, rather than having to use a reconciliation bill to make the
changes in existing law.  Once action has been completed on the reconciliation
resolution, and any necessary changes are made in the enrollment of the spending
measures held at the desk, they are cleared for the President.
Several budget resolutions in the early 1980s contained deferred enrollment
provisions, but the release of the deferred measures was made contingent upon the
adoption of the then-required second budget resolution, not upon the passage of
reconciliation legislation.
Other Authorities
Key elements of the methodology used to prepare budget baselines and score
budgetary legislation are laid out in Section 257 of the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.  Other scoring practices that underpin the
congressional budget process, including reconciliation procedures, are rooted partly
in scorekeeping guidelines that were included in the joint explanatory statements
accompanying two reconciliation acts — the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990 and the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.12
One of the guidelines, number 3, specifically refers to the treatment of
reconciliation legislation under certain circumstances.  Guideline number 3 requires
that changes in direct spending (i.e., entitlement and other mandatory spending,
including offsetting receipts), made in annual appropriations acts, be scored against
the Appropriations Committees’ Section 302(b) allocations of spending made under
the budget resolution.  The guideline states, in part, that “direct spending savings that
are included in both an appropriations bill and a reconciliation bill will be scored to
the reconciliation bill and not to the appropriations bill.”
Section 258C (2 U.S.C. 907d) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
Control Act of 1985 (Title II of P.L. 99-177, as amended) established a special
reconciliation process in the Senate, but not the House, tied initially to statutory
deficit targets, and subsequently, to a statutory pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) requirement.
Violations of the deficit targets and PAYGO requirement were to be enforced by
“sequestration,” a process entailing the automatic imposition of largely across-the-
board spending cuts.
Section 258C, which was never invoked, provided for the consideration of
reconciliation legislation in the fall in order to achieve deficit reductions that would
obviate the need for an expected sequester under the PAYGO requirement (or,
previously, the deficit targets).  The PAYGO requirement effectively expired at the
end of the 107th Congress.13  All of the reconciliation measures considered by the
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Go” (PAYGO) Requirement for FY2003 and Later Years, by Robert Keith.
Senate thus far have originated pursuant to Section 310 of the 1974 act.  (Sections
310 and 313 of the 1974 act currently reference the reconciliation process under
Section 258C of the 1985 act.)
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Reconciliation Directives in Budget Resolutions
Features of Reconciliation Directives
The fundamental purpose of reconciliation directives is to compel committees
to develop legislation to achieve certain goals reflected in the budget resolution that
require changes in existing law (or pending legislation) to be realized.  A directive
to a committee represents an expression of the intent of the parent chamber that the
specified legislative action be carried out.
Reconciliation directives, and the budget resolution policies that underpin them,
are expressed in terms of highly aggregated dollar amounts and do not determine the
budgetary outcomes for individual accounts, programs, or activities.  Decisions at
these levels remain the prerogative of the committees with jurisdiction over spending
and revenue legislation.  In a few rare instances, however, reconciliation directives
have been couched in programmatic terms.  In the FY1981 budget resolution, for
example, the Senate Appropriations Committee was instructed to “limit
appropriations for fiscal year 1981 subsidies to the U.S. Postal Service” to a
particular level as part of the reconciliation directives.14  In response to a
parliamentary inquiry on May 19, 1982, however, the Senate Presiding Officer
advised that reconciliation directives may not specify that the instructed committee
must achieve its changes from certain types of programs or in specific ways.15
Nonetheless, the Budget Committees may indicate particular options or
assumptions that would allow an instructed committee to meet its spending or
revenue reconciliation directives, partly to garner credibility and support for the
budget resolution and partly to influence the subsequent policy debates.
A reconciliation directive to a committee usually consists of several
components:  (1) an identification of the House or Senate committee being instructed;
(2) the type of budgetary changes that are intended to be achieved by changes in laws,
bills, and resolutions within the instructed committee’s jurisdiction, together with
specified amounts; (3) the fiscal year periods to which the changes apply; and (4) a
deadline by which the instructed committees must submit their recommendations to
their respective Budget Committee, or, if singly instructed, report them to their
chamber.  Each dollar amount of change for a fiscal year time period is regarded as
a separate directive.  A committee instructed to achieve savings in direct spending
outlays of $100 million for the first fiscal year and $800 million for a five-fiscal year
period, for example, is considered to be subject to two different directives.
Given that the language authorizing reconciliation directives refers to “changes,”
such directives may properly recommend both increases and decreases in revenues,
spending, and the debt limit (see further discussion below).
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16 Congress and the President create new budget authority through the enactment of laws.
Agencies incur obligations (that is, financial liabilities through such means as employing
personnel, entering into contracts, and submitting purchase orders) within the framework
of available budget authority.  Finally, outlays (sometimes referred to as expenditures) ensue
when obligations are liquidated or paid off through such means as electronic fund transfers,
the issuance of checks, or the disbursement of cash.  Outlays levels, not budget authority
levels, are compared to revenue levels to determine the level of the deficit or surplus.
Types of Directives.  Section 310(a) of the 1974 act enumerates three
different types of budgetary changes that reconciliation directives may require:  (1)
spending, in the form of new budget authority for the budget year and thereafter,
budget authority initially provided for prior fiscal years, new entitlement authority,
and credit authority; (2) revenues; (3) and the statutory limit on the public debt.  In
addition, Section 310(a) provides that reconciliation directives may combine any of
the three types of changes, including “a direction to achieve deficit reduction”
(representing a combination of spending reductions and revenue increases).
The type of budgetary changes included in the reconciliation directives
determines the type of legislation that will result.  After the first several years of
experience with reconciliation, spending directives have applied almost exclusively
to direct spending (also known as mandatory spending), rather than discretionary
spending.  Direct spending, which is under the jurisdiction of the legislative
committees of the House and Senate, funds entitlements and other mandatory
programs (e.g., Medicare, unemployment compensation, federal employee
retirement), largely on a permanent basis.  Discretionary spending, which mainly
funds the ongoing operations of federal agencies, falls under the jurisdiction of the
House and Senate Appropriations Committees and is provided in annual
appropriations acts.
Under current practice, reconciliation directives for direct spending generally
refer to changes in outlay levels.16  While such directives usually specify the dollar
amounts by which outlay levels are to be changed, for a time the House Budget
Committee specified the total outlay level that should occur after the required
changes had been made.  (Therefore, the amount of changes involved had to be
calculated by comparing baseline levels to the levels expected to occur following
reconciliation.)  In the course of complying with a directive to change spending, a
committee may recommend changes in offsetting collections or offsetting receipts
within its jurisdiction; offsetting collections, which include many user fees, are
treated as negative spending.
Reconciliation directives have sometimes been used to affect discretionary
spending levels, although this is not the usual practice.  Initially, reconciliation was
used to directly change the levels of discretionary spending.  The House
Appropriations Committee (in the FY1981 budget resolution) and the Senate
Appropriations Committee (in the FY1981 and FY1982 budget resolutions) were
instructed to reduce spending for the fiscal year already in progress.  In order to
comply with these instructions, the committees recommended rescissions of annual
appropriations that already had been enacted.  (The rescissions were considered
separately from the reconciliation legislation for those years.)
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A more expansive, and indirect, attempt to reduce discretionary spending
through the reconciliation process occurred in 1981.  The FY1982 budget resolution
included reconciliation directives that, in part, required legislative committees to
reduce authorizations of appropriations.  The intent behind this approach was to set
in place reduced authorization levels over a three-year period that would reduce
spending levels in the annual appropriations acts considered in each of those years.
This approach was widely regarded as having unnecessarily complicated the
reconciliation legislation and strained relationships between the authorizing
committees and the Appropriations Committees.  The House and Senate Budget
Committees have not returned to this approach, except occasionally on a much more
selective basis.  In the Senate, such language probably would be judged extraneous
under the Byrd rule, on the ground that it does not affect outlays.
Due to the dispersal of spending jurisdiction to almost every standing committee
of the House and Senate, nearly every one of them has been involved in
reconciliation at least once.
Directives to change revenue levels have been less complicated generally in that
they have not differentiated between different sources of revenue, such as individual
incomes taxes, corporate income taxes, or excise taxes.  On occasion, revenue
reconciliation directives have been accompanied by directives to change outlays
because some tax-related changes, such as increases in refundable tax credits, are
scored as outlays.  (Conversely, in some instances changes in spending programs may
affect revenue levels.)
As mentioned previously, reconciliation directives may also instruct a
committee to achieve a level of “deficit reduction,” reflecting a combination of
spending reductions and revenues increases at the committee’s discretion.
In the reconciliation process, compliance with reconciliation directives is judged
on a net basis, or on the basis of the “bottom line.”  Consequently, directives to
reduce spending or increase revenues in order to achieve deficit reduction generally
may include “sweeteners” that increase spending and reduce revenues, so long as the
required amount of deficit reduction is accomplished.
As practiced by the House and Senate, a reconciliation instruction to reduce
spending, or increase revenues, includes a target that is a minimum amount of
spending reduction, or revenue increase (a floor).  Similarly, a reconciliation
instruction to increase spending, or reduce revenues, includes a target that is a
maximum amount of spending increase, or revenue reduction (a ceiling).
For years, the public debt limit has been codified in Section 3101(b) of Title 31,
United States Code.  Periodic adjustments in the debt limit take the form of
amendments to 31 U.S.C. 3101(b), usually by striking the current dollar limitation
and inserting a new one.  While most adjustments to the debt limit have been
increases, in some instances the debt limit has been reduced or extended at its current
level for a specified interval.  For example, P.L. 455 of the 79th Congress (60 Stat.
316; June 26, 1946) reduced the debt limit from $300 billion to $275 billion as
budget surpluses reemerged following World War II.  While the debt limit has been
adjusted in reconciliation legislation, in most instances Congress employs another
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type of measure for this purpose.  The House Ways and Means Committee and the
Senate Finance Committee exercise jurisdiction over the debt limit.17
From time to time, budget resolutions have included contingent reconciliation
directives.  Under a contingent directive, the amount of changes in spending or
revenue that a committee is directed to achieve may be adjusted at a later time upon
the happening of a contingency.  The FY1998 budget resolution, for example,
provided for an adjustment in the Senate Finance Committee’s reconciliation
directives (as well as the committee’s spending allocations and other budget levels)
to accommodate a five-year children’s health initiative of up to $16 billion.  The
adjustments were made contingent upon the committee reporting reconciliation
legislation with an excess of outlay savings so that the additional spending on the
children’s health initiative would be deficit neutral.18
In at least one instance, reconciliation directives to a committee became
effective (without any adjustment) upon the happening of a contingency.  The
FY1996 budget resolution contained directives to the Senate Finance Committee to
reduce revenues by $245 billion over seven years upon the certification by the
Congressional Budget Office that spending reconciliation legislation would lead to
a balanced budget by FY2002.  Under the budget resolution, if CBO did not certify
a balanced budget, the revenue reconciliation directives to the committee would not
become effective, and the revenue reductions could not be included in the final
reconciliation bill.19
Multiple Directives
The House and Senate typically use multiple directives, in terms of the number
of committees instructed and the types of budgetary changes designated, when
initiating the reconciliation process.  Whenever the House and Senate included
spending reconciliation directives in a budget resolution, more than one House and
Senate committee received them, except for the FY2002 and FY2004 budget
resolutions; in these two cases, the House Ways and Means Committee and the
Senate Finance Committee received instructions regarding outlays in order to
accommodate the outlay effects of certain changes in revenue laws.
The number of House and Senate committees given spending reconciliation
directives in a budget resolution ranged from one, for both chambers (both in the
FY2002 and FY2004 budget resolutions), to 14 for the Senate and 15 for the House
(both in the FY1982 budget resolution).
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Reconciliation directives to change the statutory limit on the public debt are
made only to a single committee in each chamber, because the House Ways and
Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee exercise sole jurisdiction in
their chambers over this matter.  While reconciliation directives to change revenue
levels principally involve the Ways and Means Committee and the Finance
Committee, other committees sometimes receive such instructions as well.  As stated
previously, the Ways and Means Committee and Finance Committee exercise
jurisdiction in their chambers over the tax code and revenues generally, but some
other committees exercise jurisdiction over matters, such as certain fees, involving
budgetary transactions that are treated as revenues.
When reconciliation directives require different types of budgetary changes, the
committee recommendations affecting revenues, spending, or the debt limit, as
appropriate, may be incorporated into a single omnibus measure or considered as
separate measures, depending on how the directives are fashioned.  In the FY1998
budget resolution, for example, the Senate Finance Committee received a two-part
reconciliation directive in Section 104(a).  Section 104(a)(5)(A) instructed the
committee to reduce outlays (by $40.911 billion for FY2002 and $100.646 billion for
FY1998-FY2002) and Section 104(a)(5)(B) instructed the committee to increase the
statutory limit on the public debt (to not more than $5.950 trillion).  Seven other
Senate committees received an instruction to reduce spending (or the deficit) in
Section 104(a).  In a separate provision, Section 104(b), the Finance Committee was
instructed to reduce revenues (by not more than $20.5 billion in FY2002 and $85
billion for FY1998-FY2002).  Accordingly, in response to its directives, the Finance
Committee could develop reconciliation legislation reducing spending and raising the
debt limit, for inclusion in an omnibus bill, and reducing revenues in a separate bill.
Under current procedures in the Senate, only one reconciliation measure of each
type of budgetary change is allowed.  Thus, a budget resolution may create as many
as three reconciliation bills — one for spending, one for revenues, and one for the
debt limit.  The reconciliation directives, however, may not lead to two reconciliation
bills for spending, or two for revenues, or two for the debt limit.  In the case of the
FY2006 budget resolution, for example, the directives to eight Senate committees to
reduce direct spending, and to the Senate Finance Committee to reduce revenues and
increase the debt limit, are expected to result, at most, in three reconciliation
measures — a spending bill, a revenue bill, and a debt-limit bill.
House practices in this regard allow for greater latitude in the development of
multiple reconciliation measures.  Reconciliation measures may mix together
different types of reconciliation changes, and more than one reconciliation measure
involving a particular type of budgetary change may be provided for under the
reconciliation directives.  The FY1997 budget resolution, for example, provided for
the potential consideration of three separate reconciliation measures in the House,
including a “Welfare and Medicaid Reform and Tax Relief” act, a “Medicare
Preservation” act, and a “Tax and Miscellaneous Direct Spending Reforms” act.  As
explained by the House Budget Committee:
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20 See the conference report on the FY1997 budget resolution, Concurrent Resolution on the
Budget for Fiscal Year 1997 (to accompany H.Con.Res. 178), H.Rept. 104-612, June 7,
1996, p. 81.
21 The “budget year” is the upcoming fiscal year (beginning on October 1) at the time the
budget resolution is under consideration.  Budget resolutions sometimes include revised
figures for the “current year,” which is the fiscal year in progress at the time the budget
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The House conferees note that the multi-reconciliation process provides
maximum flexibility to achieve the changes in spending and the tax relief
assumed in this conference report.  For example, any of the spending or revenue
changes assumed in the first bill could — if not enacted — be achieved in the
third bill.20
Given that the Senate’s flexibility in packaging reconciliation legislation is
relatively more constrained under its current practices compared with past ones, the
House is more constrained in its choice of reconciliation packaging as well.
Consequently, a reconciliation procedure in the House as flexible as the one proposed
for FY1997 may no longer be practicable.
Impact of Directives on the Deficit or Surplus
During the period covering FY1981 through FY2006, the House and Senate
adopted 18 budget resolutions containing reconciliation directives.  (The budget
resolutions for FY1985, FY1989, FY1992, FY1993, and FY1995 did not include
reconciliation directives; also, the House and Senate did not reach final agreement
on budget resolutions for FY1999, FY2003, and FY2005.)  The reconciliation
directives included in budget resolutions through FY1998 were intended to reduce
the deficit in the net; the directives in budget resolutions since then (through
FY2006), while part of an overall budget resolution policy to improve the budgetary
posture over time, on their own terms proposed reducing the surplus or increasing the
deficit in the net (by virtue of revenue reductions).
The reconciliation directives to House and Senate committees during this period
generally were of comparable scope, although there were some significant differences
in particular years.  Table 2 and Table 3 present information on the reconciliation
directives to House committees during this period to illustrate the relationship taken
generally by the House and Senate between reconciliation and deficit reduction.
As Table 2 shows, all 18 of the budget resolutions recommended policies that
assumed an improvement in budgetary posture from the budget year to the final fiscal
year covered, either by changing a deficit into a surplus (seven instances), reducing
a deficit to a lower level (eight instances), or increasing a surplus to a higher level
(three instances).21  For example, over a five-year time frame, the budget resolution
for FY1991 called for a deficit of $64 billion in the first year and surplus of $156
billion in the final year; the budget resolution for FY1994 called for a deficit of $254
billion in the first year and a deficit of $202 billion in the final year; and the budget
resolution for FY2001 called for a surplus of $170 billion in the first year and a
surplus of $232 billion in the final year.
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22  The amounts of revenue reduction expected to occur over the multiyear period,
apparently by means of reconciliation, were indicated in the joint explanatory statement
accompanying the conference report for each of the fiscal years involved.  While the
amounts of direct spending reductions in reconciliation directives to House committees were
not indicated in the joint explanatory statements, such amounts in reconciliation directives
to Senate committees yielded estimated net savings of $387.1 billion (over seven years) in
the FY1996 budget resolution, $228.9 billion (over six years) in the FY1997 budget
resolution, and $52.2 billion (over five years) in the FY1998 budget resolution.
The reconciliation directives in the first 10 budget resolutions listed in Table
2, covering through FY1981-FY1994, all recommended net deficit reduction in the
aggregate, ranging from $12 billion (in the FY1981 budget resolution) to $343 billion
(in the FY1994 budget resolution).  The reconciliation directives included revenue
increases, spending decreases (and other changes), or a combination thereof intended
to eliminate or reduce the deficit by the final year.
  
With regard to the next three budget resolutions (for FY1996, FY1997, and
FY1998), precise data are not available because the reconciliation directives to House
committees were not expressed as amounts of change from baseline levels, but rather
were expressed as the levels of revenue and direct spending outlays that were to
result from the changes.  The reconciliation directives in these three budget
resolutions, however, generally were regarded as containing revenue reductions that
were expected to be more than offset by reductions in direct spending.22
The remaining five sets of reconciliation directives (in the FY2000-FY2002,
FY2004, and FY2006 budget resolutions), all recommended net reductions in the
surplus/increases in the deficit, ranging from $35 billion (over six years) to $1.350
trillion (over 11 years).
The budget resolutions for FY2000-FY2002 included directives that
recommended large revenue reductions (and a $100 billion increase in outlays in the
FY2002 budget resolution) without offsetting changes. These resolutions
recommended allocating a portion of the projected surpluses for tax cuts; in each
case, the estimated final year surplus was larger than estimated for the first year.
The FY2004 budget resolution included reconciliation directives that
recommended large revenue reductions (and a $27 billion increase in outlays)
without any offsetting changes.  Despite aggregate reductions in the surplus/increases
in the deficit through reconciliation of $550 billion over 11 years, covering FY2003-
FY2013, the budget resolution envisioned a deficit of $385.0 billion for the budget
year becoming a surplus of $36.8 billion by the final year.
The FY2006 budget resolution included reconciliation directives that
recommended revenue reductions of $70 billion over five years (FY2006-FY2010)
and outlay reductions of $35 billion over six years (including FY2005) in the context
of a decline in the total deficit over the period.
Table 3 provides more detailed information on the overall deficit and surplus
levels and the reconciliation directives to House committees in the budget resolutions
for this period.
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Table 2.  Summary of Reconciliation Directives to House Committees and Overall Deficit or Surplus Levels in Budget
Resolutions for FY1981-FY2006
(amounts in $ billions)
Budget Resolution a
Reconciliation Directives:
Increases (+) or Decreases (-) in the Deficit
Deficit (-) or Surplus (+) Levels

















FY1981 2 +4 -7 -12 +1  — 
FY1982 3 0 -137 -137 -38 +1
FY1983 3 +98 -27 -125 -104 -60
FY1984 3 +73 -12 -85 -170 -127
FY1986 3 0 -88 -88 -172 -113
FY1987 3 0 -24 -24 -143 -78
FY1988 3 +64 -29 -93 -108 -50
FY1990 2 +11 -13 -24 -100 -66




Increases (+) or Decreases (-) in the Deficit
Deficit (-) or Surplus (+) Levels

















FY1994 5 0 -343 d -343 d -254 -202
FY1996 7 -245  — e  — e -170 +6
FY1997 6 -122  — e  — e -153 +5
FY1998 5 -85  — e  — e -91 +2
FY2000 10 -778 0 +778 +141 +248
FY2001 5 -150 0 +150 +170 +232
FY2002 11 -1,250 +100 +1,350 +219 +514
FY2004 11 -535 +15 +550 -385 +37
FY2006 6 -70 -35 +35 -383 -211
Sources:  conference reports on budget resolutions (see Table 3 for complete listing).
a The budget resolutions for FY1985, FY1989, FY1992, FY1993, and FY1995 did not contain reconciliation directives; also, the House and Senate did not reach final
agreement on budget resolutions for FY1999, FY2003, and FY2005.  Details may not add to totals due to rounding.
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b The “revenue changes” column reflects reconciliation directives to the House Ways and Means Committee to change revenue levels, and the “outlay (or deficit
reduction) changes” column reflects reconciliation directives to all House committees to change outlay levels or to achieve deficit reduction, which in some cases
could have allowed additional revenue increases beyond those reflected in the preceding column.  “Net decreases (-)” in the deficit also refers to net increases
in the surplus; “net increases (+)” in the deficit also refers to net decreases in the surplus.
c Although the text of the budget resolution reflects only the on-budget deficit or surplus (as required by law), tables in the joint explanatory statement accompanying
the conference report usually reflect the total deficit or surplus (which includes the off-budget Social Security trust funds and Postal Service Fund).  This column
presents total deficit or surplus levels, unless otherwise noted.
d The $343.1 billion in “outlay (or deficit reduction) changes” and “net decreases” excludes $42.953 billion in reconciled reductions in authorizations.
e Reconciliation directives to House committees in the budget resolutions for FY1996-FY1998 were not expressed as amounts of change from baseline levels, but rather
were expressed as the levels of revenue and direct spending outlays that were to result from the changes.  The amounts of revenue reduction expected to occur
over the multiyear period, apparently by means of reconciliation, were indicated in the joint explanatory statement accompanying the conference report for each
of the fiscal years involved; see H.Rept. 104-159, page 89 (for FY1996), H.Rept. 104-612, page 51 (for FY1997), and H.Rept. 105-116, page 100 (for FY1998).
While the amounts of direct spending reductions in reconciliation directives to House committees were not indicated in the joint explanatory statements, such
amounts in reconciliation directives to Senate committees yielded estimated net savings of $387.1 billion (over seven years) in the FY1996 budget resolution,
$228.9 billion (over six years) in the FY1997 budget resolution, and $52.2 billion (over five years) in the FY1998 budget resolution.
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Table 3.  Detailed Information on Reconciliation Directives to House Committees
and Overall Deficit or Surplus Levels in Budget Resolutions for FY1981-FY2006
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or Increases (+) d
1981 H.Con.Res. 307 2
(1980-1981)
+4.2 -7.4 f -11.6 (on budget)
Budget year: +0.5
1982 H.Con.Res. 115 3
(1982-1984)




1983 S.Con.Res. 92 3
(1983-1985)




1984 H.Con.Res. 91 3
(1984-1986)










Increases (+) or Decreases (-) in the Deficit Deficit (-) or












or Increases (+) d
1985 [No reconciliation directives in budget resolution]
1986 S.Con.Res. 32 3
(1986-1988)




1987 S.Con.Res. 120 3
(1987-1989)
0.0 -24.2 -24.2 Budget year: -142.6
Second year: -115.7
Third year: -77.9
1988 H.Con.Res. 93 3
(1988-1990)




1989 [No reconciliation directives in budget resolution]
1990 H.Con.Res. 106 2
(1990-1991)
+10.6 -13.3 -23.9 Budget year: -99.7
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or Increases (+) d
1991 H.Con.Res. 310 5
(1991-1995)





1992 [No reconciliation directives in budget resolution]
1993 [No reconciliation directives in budget resolution]
1994 H.Con.Res. 64 5
(1994-1998)
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1996 H.Con.Res. 67 7
(1996-2002)







1997 H.Con.Res. 178 6
(1997-2002)






1998 H.Con.Res. 84 5
(1998-2002)
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2000 H.Con.Res. 68 10
(2000-2009)










2001 H.Con.Res. 290 5
(2001-2005)
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2002 H.Con.Res. 83 11
(2001-2011)

















Increases (+) or Decreases (-) in the Deficit Deficit (-) or












or Increases (+) d
2004 H.Con.Res. 95 11
(2003-2013)










2005 [House and Senate did not reach final agreement on a budget resolution]
2005 H.Con.Res. 95 6
(2005-2010)






FY1981 — conference report on H.Con.Res. 307, H.Rept. 96-1051 (May 23, 1980), pages 27 and 28.
FY1982 — conference report on H.Con.Res. 115, H.Rept. 97-46 (May 15, 1981), pages 41-43 and 46. 
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FY1983 — conference report on S.Con.Res. 92, H.Rept. 97-614 (June 21, 1982), pages 19 and 29;
FY1984 — conference report on H.Con.Res. 91, H.Rept. 98-248 (June 21, 1983), pages 29, 45, and 46;
FY1986 — conference report on S.Con.Res. 32, H.Rept. 99-249 (August 1, 1985), pages 24, 32, and 33;
FY1987 — conference report on S.Con.Res. 120, H.Rept. 99-664 (June 26, 1986), pages 20, 30, and 31;
FY1988 — conference report on H.Con.Res. 93, H.Rept. 100-175 (June 22, 1987), pages 23 and 30-32;
FY1990 — conference report on H.Con.Res. 106, H.Rept. 101-50 (May 15, 1989), pages 19, 29, and 30;
FY1991 — conference report on H.Con.Res. 310, H.Rept. 101-820 (October 7, 1990), pages 21, 26, and 27;
FY1994 — conference report on H.Con.Res. 62, H.Rept. 103-48 (March 31, 1993), pages 38 and 41-43; 
FY1996 — conference report on H.Con.Res. 67, H.Rept. 104-159 (June 26, 1995), pages 44 and 50-51;
FY1997 — conference report on H.Con.Res. 178, H.Rept. 104-612 (June 7, 1996), pages 56 and 83-84;
FY1998 — conference report on H.Con.Res. 84, H.Rept. 105-116 (June 4, 1997), pages 58, 100, and 104-105; 
FY2000 — conference report on H.Con.Res. 68, H.Rept. 106-91 (April 14, 1999), pages 36, and 61;
FY2001 — conference report on H.Con.Res. 290, H.Rept. 106-577 (April 12, 2000), pages 49 and 66;
FY2002 — conference report on H.Con.Res. 83, H.Rept. 107-60 (May 8, 2001), pages 48, and 76-77;
FY2004 — conference report on H.Con.Res. 95, H.Rept. 108-71 (April 10, 2003), pages 38 and 102-104; and
FY2006 — conference report on H.Con.Res. 95, H.Rept. 109-62 (April 18, 2005), pages 50 and 68-71.
Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding.
a The reconciliation directives applied to the budget year (i.e., the fiscal year beginning on October 1 of the calendar year in which the budget resolution was
considered) and ensuing fiscal years covered by the budget resolution, except that reconciliation directives in budget resolutions for FY1981, FY2002, and
FY2004 also applied to the current year (i.e., the fiscal year in progress at the time).
b This column reflects reconciliation directives to the House Ways and Means Committee to change revenue levels.
c This column reflects reconciliation directives to all House committees to change outlay levels or to achieve deficit reduction (which in some cases could have allowed
additional revenue increases beyond those reflected in the preceding column).
d  “Net decreases (-)” in the deficit also refers to net increases in the surplus; “net increases (+)” in the deficit also refers to net decreases in the surplus.
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e Although the text of the budget resolution reflects only the on-budget deficit or surplus (as required by law), tables in the joint explanatory statement accompanying
the conference report usually reflect the total deficit or surplus (which includes the off-budget Social Security trust funds and Postal Service Fund).  This column
presents total deficit or surplus levels, unless otherwise noted, and does not include any revised deficit or surplus figures for the current fiscal year.
f In addition to reconciliation directives to House and Senate Committees for FY1981, the budget resolution included reconciliation directives to the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees to reduce spending for FY1980.  Accordingly, savings of $1.0 billion in outlays from the directives to the Appropriations Committees
are reflected in this figure.
g The $343.1 billion in “other changes” and “net savings” excludes $42.953 billion in reconciled reductions in authorizations.
h Reconciliation directives to House committees in the budget resolutions for FY1996-FY1998 were not expressed as amounts of change from baseline levels, but
rather were expressed as the levels of revenue and direct spending outlays that were to result from the changes.  The amounts of revenue reduction expected to
occur over the multiyear period, apparently by means of reconciliation, were indicated in the joint explanatory statement accompanying the conference report
for each of the fiscal years involved; see H.Rept. 104-159, page 89 (for FY1996), H.Rept. 104-612, page 51 (for FY1997), and H.Rept. 105-116, page 100 (for
FY1998).  While the amounts of direct spending reductions in reconciliation directives to House committees were not indicated in the joint explanatory
statements, such amounts in reconciliation directives to Senate committees yielded estimated net savings of $387.1 billion (over seven years) in the FY1996
budget resolution, $228.9 billion (over six years) in the FY1997 budget resolution, and $52.2 billion (over five years) in the FY1998 budget resolution.
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23 See House Budget Committee, Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (report to accompany H.R.
2015), H.Rept. 105-149, June 24, 1997, pp. 497-1619.
24 For detailed information on House committee markup procedures, see CRS Report
RL30244, The Committee Markup Process in the House of Representatives, by Judy
Schneider.
25 Under clause 1(a)(1)(B) of House Rule XI, if printed copies of the legislative text to be
marked up are available, the reading of the text may be waived by majority vote on a
(continued...)
Initial Consideration in the House
Four aspects of House action at this stage of the reconciliation process are
addressed in this section:  (1) the development of legislative recommendations by the
instructed committees; (2) the preparation of an omnibus measure by the House
Budget Committee; (3) the special rule providing for the consideration of
reconciliation legislation; and (4) floor consideration of reconciliation legislation.
Development of Legislative Recommendations by the
Instructed Committees
Each committee included in the reconciliation directives is instructed to
recommend legislative changes to existing law to meet specific budgetary targets by
a certain date.  The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 does not provide any special
requirements (other than meeting those specified in the reconciliation directives in
a budget resolution) or any guidance as to the procedures committees must follow to
develop their legislative recommendations pursuant to reconciliation directives.  The
instructed committees generally follow the rules and practices of developing
legislation under the normal legislative process.
It is expected that each instructed committee will comply with the pertinent
requirements in the Standing Rules of the House, as well as its committee rules,
when developing its legislative recommendations pursuant to the reconciliation
directives.  In particular, clause 2(h)(1) of House Rule XI requires that a committee
must meet, with a majority quorum present, to report its reconciliation
recommendations.
Prior to marking up and reporting reconciliation recommendations, as in the
case of other legislation, instructed committees often hold hearings.  In 1997, for
example, in developing reconciliation recommendations pursuant to the directives
in the FY1998 budget resolution, at least four of the eight instructed committees
conducted oversight and legislative hearings related to its reconciliation
recommendations subsequently transmitted to the House Budget Committee.23
Committee Markup Procedures.  While there are variations among
committees’ formal rules and informal practices, House committees typically follow
a standard markup process.24  Under this process, the legislative text to be considered
first is read in full, unless waived by a majority vote or unanimous consent, and then
it is read for amendment, section by section.25  Amendments are considered under a
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privileged non-debatable motion.  If printed copies are not available, the reading of the text
may be waived only by unanimous consent.
26 House Budget Committee, Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (report to accompany H.R. 2015),
H.Rept. 105-149, June 24, 1997.
27 Ibid., pp. 977-1089.
28 House Ways and Means Committee, Jobs and Growth Reconciliation Tax Act of 2003
(report to accompany H.R. 2), H.Rept. 108-94, May 8, 2003.
five-minute rule.  At the end of consideration of the legislative text and amendments,
a committee votes to order the legislation reported to the House directly or, if
instructed by the reconciliation directives, transmitted to the House Budget
Committee.
A key decision in the markup process is selecting the text the committee will
consider.  A committee may consider a bill introduced and referred to the committee
or consider draft legislation that has not been introduced.  In most cases, in response
to reconciliation directives, committees have considered draft legislation developed
by the committee’s staff, instead of a bill introduced and referred to the committee.
In 1997, for example, pursuant to the reconciliation directives contained in the
FY1998 budget resolution, all eight committees instructed to submit to the House
Budget Committee legislative recommendations changing existing law considered
original legislative language as the markup text.26  Three of these committees
considered its reconciliation recommendations in the form of committee prints as the
markup text.  Only one committee considered a bill introduced and referred to the
committee.  In that case, the Education and the Workforce Committee considered
H.R. 1515 and incorporated the text of the bill, as amended during markup, into its
reconciliation recommendations; the committee, as well, ordered the bill reported,
as amended, to the House directly.27
In some cases, however, especially in those cases when a committee received
instructions to report legislative recommendations to the House directly, as in recent
years, committees have considered a bill introduced and referred to the committee as
the markup vehicle.  In 2003, for example, the House Ways and Means Committee
considered and marked up H.R. 2, which had been previously introduced and referred
to the committee, as the legislative vehicle to respond to its reconciliation directives
contained in the FY2004 budget resolution.28
Committee Submissions.  As mentioned above, the reconciliation directives
contained in a budget resolution specify a certain date in which an instructed
committee is required to report its legislative recommendations. In addition, the
directives indicate, as provided in the 1974 act, whether a committee is required to
report its legislative recommendations to the House directly or to submit such
recommendations to the House Budget Committee.  Section 310(b) of the 1974 act
specifies two options for the submission of legislative recommendations to comply
with reconciliation directives:  (1) if one committee is instructed, the committee
reports its legislative recommendations to its parent chamber directly; or (2) if two
CRS-34
29 The five budget resolutions are those for FY1981, FY2000, FY2001, FY2002, and
FY2004.  The FY1981 budget resolution contained a separate reconciliation directive to the
House Appropriations Committee to report legislation to the House directly, in addition to
instructions to multiple committees to submit legislation to the House Budget Committee.
Therefore, the FY1981 budget resolution also is counted as one (of the 13) which included
instructions to submit legislation to the House Budget Committee.
30 For additional information on the required contents of committee reports, see CRS Report
98-169 GOV, House Committee Reports: Required Contents, by Judy Schneider.
31 House Budget Committee, House Reconciliation Guidelines, June 24, 2005, pp. 2-3
(prepared by the Republican staff).  For additional information, see:  House Budget
Committee, Budget Reconciliation:  What It Is and How It Works, May 18, 2005 (prepared
by the Democratic staff).
or more committees are instructed, the committees submit their legislative
recommendations to their respective Budget Committee.
Of the 17 budget resolutions that have contained reconciliation directives,
excluding the FY2006 budget resolution, five budget resolutions contained directives
instructing a committee to report legislation to the House directly.29  Thirteen budget
resolutions directed two or more committees to submit legislative recommendations
to the House Budget Committee.
In either case, the submission material is similar.  A committee reporting its
reconciliation recommendations to the House directly must include the required
contents of a written report to accompany the reported legislation.  Such information
includes, for example, supplemental, minority, or additional views, a cost estimate,
and committee rollcall votes.30
In the case of submissions to the House Budget Committee, the Budget
Committee typically provides guidance to the instructed committees, requesting that
they include with their reconciliation submissions similar material required in a
committee report.  This year, for example, the Budget Committee requested the
following material to be submitted by each instructed committee:
1.  legislative text;
2.  transmittal letter signed by the committee chairman;
3.  summary of the major policy decisions in the legislation;
4.  section-by-section description;
5.  committee oversight findings;
6.  constitutional authority statement;
7.  committee votes;
8.  Ramseyer statement regarding the text of changes made in existing law;
9.  performance goals; and
10.  supplemental, additional, and minority views.31
When a committee is directed to submit reconciliation recommendations to the
Budget Committee, it also may report legislation to the House directly.  On at least
two occasions, for example, the Ways and Means Committee submitted
reconciliation recommendations to the Budget Committee as well as reporting
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32 The House Ways and Means Committee reported H.R. 7652 (H.Rept. 96-1150, Prt. 1, July
2, 1980) pursuant to its FY1981 reconciliation directives and H.R. 3850 (H.Rept. 97-143,
Prt.1, June 12, 1981) pursuant to its FY1982 reconciliation directives.
33 See Congressional Record, vol. 128, Aug. 10, 1982, p. 20216.
34 The submission date for each committee is reflected on its transmittal letter to the Budget
Committee.  See House Budget Committee, Seven-Year Balanced Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1995 (report to accompany H.R. 2491), H.Rept. 104-280, Oct. 17, 1995.
35 In 1983, due to delays by committees to submit their reconciliation recommendations, the
House extended by unanimous consent the submission deadline from July 22 to September
23.  See the print of the House Budget Committee, A Review of the Reconciliation Process,
October 1984, Serial No. CP-9, p. 43.  After this instance, it does not appear the House
extended the submission deadline again.
legislation, containing those recommendations, to the House directly.32  In addition,
on at least one occasion, several instructed committees reported reconciliation
legislation to the House directly instead of submitting their recommendations to the
Budget Committee.  In 1982, four of the nine instructed committees reported
individual reconciliation measures to the House directly.  The House considered and
passed each of these measures individually and subsequently incorporated them into
one omnibus reconciliation bill (H.R. 6955, 97th Congress).33
Compliance with Reconciliation Directives.  Each instructed committee
is expected to comply with its reconciliation directives, specifically with regard to
submitting its reconciliation recommendations by the date specified and
recommending legislative changes to existing law projected to produce the budgetary
changes specified.  Neither the 1974 act nor the Standing Rules of the House
provides a point of order, or any other sanction, against a committee’s reconciliation
recommendations, or the subsequent omnibus reconciliation legislation, for not
complying with the reconciliation directives.  The House Rules Committee, however,
as will be discussed further below, under Section 310(d)(5) of the 1974 act, may
make in order amendments to achieve compliance if one or more committees fail to
submit their legislative recommendations pursuant to their reconciliation instructions.
In the past, several committees have submitted their reconciliation
recommendations after the submission deadline or not at all.  In 1995, for example,
nine of the 12 instructed committees submitted their reconciliation recommendations
to the Budget Committee after the September 22 deadline.34  All of the tardy
submissions were included in the reconciliation measure reported by the Budget
Committee.  In this case, as in the past, it does not appear that the late submissions
caused any procedural consequences.35
In several instances, one or more of the instructed committees did not submit
any legislative recommendations.   In at least two years, 1981 and 1995, the House
Rules Committee made in order amendments that provided language within the
jurisdiction of the non-compliant committees to satisfy their reconciliation directives.
In 1995, for example, the Rules Committee made in order an amendment in the
nature of a substitute, offered by then-Budget Committee Chairman John Kasich,
that, among other things, achieved compliance for the House Agriculture
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36 In 1995, the House Agriculture Committee was unable to approve and therefore to submit
reconciliation recommendations.  See David Hosansky, “Panel Rejects Farm Overhaul In
a Rebuke to Leadership,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Sept. 23, 1995, pp. 2875-
2879.  See the print of the House Budget Committee, The Seven-Year Balanced Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1995:  An Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute for H.R. 2491, Oct.
20, 1995, Serial No. CP-3.  The House Rules Committee reported a rule (H.Res. 245,
H.Rept. 104-292) for the consideration of H.R. 2491 making in order the amendment in the
nature of a substitute.
37 The motion that passed did not explicitly direct the Budget Committee chairman to
request an amendment in the rule, but instead directed the chairman to request a certain
policy impact; the chairman presumably would request a policy impact by requesting the
rule include a certain amendment.  See House Budget Committee, Balanced Budget Act of
1997 (report to accompany H.R. 2015), H.Rept. 105-149, June 24, 1997, pp. 1620-1625.
Committee.36  In 1996, several of the instructed committees did not submit
reconciliation recommendations to the Budget Committee, but reconciliation
legislation applicable to those committees was not developed.
Preparation of an Omnibus Measure by the House Budget
Committee
The House Budget Committee plays a significant, if not substantive, role in the
development of reconciliation legislation when two or more committees are directed
to recommend legislative changes pursuant to reconciliation directives.  As
mentioned above, when two or more committees are involved, each committee is
required to submit its legislative recommendations to the Budget Committee, by a
certain date, as specified in the reconciliation directives contained in the budget
resolution.  Section 310(b)(2) of the 1974 act provides that when the Budget
Committee receives all the legislative recommendations from the directed
committees, it is required to report to the House “reconciliation legislation carrying
out all such recommendations, without any substantive revision.”
In practice, this administrative function has entailed incorporating the
committee’s recommendations as separate titles into an omnibus reconciliation
measure.  The Budget Committee has performed this function formally by conducting
a markup of the reconciliation legislation.  At the end of the markup, the Budget
Committee orders reported the omnibus reconciliation legislation, containing the
instructed committees’ submissions, as an original bill.
During the markup, amendments are not considered, as in the case of a standard
committee markup, because of the prohibition against any substantive revision to the
instructed committees’ recommendations.  The Budget Committee, however,
traditionally has entertained motions to direct the Budget Committee chairman to
request that the Rules Committee make in order certain amendments.  In 1997, for
example, during the markup of H.R. 2015, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997,
committee Members made 11 motions to direct the Budget Committee chairman to
request that the rule for floor consideration include an amendment; one motion
passed, seven motions were rejected, and three motions were withdrawn.37
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38 For further information on special rules, see CRS Report 98-612, Special Rules and
Options for Regulating the Amending Process, by James V. Saturno.
The Budget Committee formally orders reported the omnibus reconciliation
measure to the House with a written report (see Table 4).  An original bill
subsequently is introduced in the House by the chairman of the Budget Committee.
Past committee reports have included an overview of the reconciliation measure,
occasionally including comments by the Budget Committee on the instructed
committees’ compliance with the reconciliation directives.
The committee report also typically contains report language submitted by the
committees, including a general explanation of the development of the legislative
recommendations and a section-by-section analysis of the recommendations.  As
mentioned above, the committee submissions usually, but not always, include all the
information that is required to be printed in committee reports, such as committee
votes.  In most cases, the Budget Committee report has included a cost estimate
prepared by the Congressional Budget Office (or, for revenue measures, the Joint
Committee on Taxation) for the recommended legislative changes submitted by each
committee.
Special Rules and the House Rules Committee
The House considers most major legislation under the provisions of a special
rule, supplementing and at times superseding the Standing Rules of the House.  A
special rule, when adopted by the House, governs the consideration of the applicable
measure, including regulating the amending process.38  The House Rules Committee
has the exclusive responsibility for developing and reporting a special rule providing
for the consideration of a measure on the House floor.
The 1974 act contemplates a role for the Rules Committee in the reconciliation
process by providing, under Section 310(d)(5), as mentioned above, that the
committee may make in order amendments to achieve changes specified by
reconciliation directives if one or more committees fails to comply with them.  As
with most major legislation considered by the House, reconciliation measures
typically have been considered under a special rule reported by the Rules Committee.
In most cases, the special rule reported by the House Rules Committee was
agreed to by the House (see Table 5).  Only one special rule was amended (in 1981
for FY1982), after the previous question was defeated, and only two were rejected
(in 1984 for FY1985 and 1988 for FY1989).
Provisions of the Special Rule.  The special rule providing for the
consideration of the reconciliation measure usually has provided for general debate;
made only certain amendments in order; placed debate limitations on some of these
amendments; waived points of order against the consideration of the reconciliation
bill, the provisions of the bill, and certain amendments; and provided for a motion
to recommit with or without instructions.
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39 The Rules Committee reported and the House agreed to a closed rule in 1985 (H.Res. 301
for H.R. 3128), 1997 (H.Res. 174 for H.R. 2015), and 2003 (H.Res. 227 for H.R. 2).  In
1989, the Rules Committee reported and the House agreed to a special rule (H.Res. 245 for
H.R. 3299) that provided for general debate only, but the subsequent special rule (H.Res.
249) provided for the consideration of amendments; therefore, for purposes of this report,
this special rule is not counted as a closed rule.
General debate under special rules providing for the consideration of a
reconciliation measure has ranged from one hour to 10 hours.  In 1980, the first time
the House considered an omnibus reconciliation measure, the special rule divided the
general debate time among all the instructed committees plus the Budget Committee.
After 1980, general debate on an omnibus reconciliation measure has been
equally divided between the chair and the ranking minority member of the Budget
Committee.  In cases when the reconciliation measure was reported by one
committee, such as in recent years with the Ways and Means Committee, the special
rule has divided the time for general debate equally between the chair and ranking
minority member of that committee.
The special rule providing for the consideration of a reconciliation measure
always has limited the consideration of amendments to the bill; a reconciliation
measure has never been considered under an open rule, as defined by the Rules
Committee.  In three instances, the Rules Committee reported and the House adopted
a rule prohibiting any floor amendments (defined as a closed rule by the Rules
Committee).39
On several occasions, especially since the mid-1980s, the special rule provided
that an amendment, or modifications to the underlying reconciliation bill, be
considered as adopted upon the adoption of the special rule (sometimes referred to
as a self-executing provision).  The special rule (H.Res. 186) on the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993, for example, included two self-executing provisions
involving:  (1) about two dozen brief amendments affecting various titles in the bill;
and (2) a new title (Title XV) dealing with the budget process.  Both of the self-
executing provisions were printed in the Rules Committee report on the special rule.
Most special rules for the consideration of a reconciliation measure have made
in order very few floor amendments.  In fact, many special rules allowed one floor
amendment only, usually an amendment in the nature of a substitute.  Moreover, only
five special rules, excluding those that prohibited any floor amendments, allowed
more than two floor amendments; the greatest number of floor amendments made in
order by a special rule was 10 in 1989 (H.Res. 249 for H.R. 3299).
In every instance that a floor amendment was made in order by the special rule,
debate on the amendment was limited by the rule as well.  Debate on individual
amendments under the special rules has ranged from 20 minutes to four hours,
equally divided between the proponent and an opponent of the amendment.
Typically, the special rule provided an hour of debate for each floor amendment.
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40 In 1985 and 1989, the special rules providing for the consideration of the reconciliation
measures (H.R. 3500 and H.R. 3299, respectively) exempted certain provisions in those bills
from the waivers of certain points of order.
41 The special rules providing for reconciliation measures in 1986 (H.Res. 558 for H.R.
5300), 1987 (H.Res. 298 for H.Res. 3545), 1990 (H.Res. 509 for H.R. 5835), and 1993
(H.Res. 186 for H.R. 2264), prohibited the inclusion of instructions in the motion to
recommit.
42 The House considered reconciliation measures under “suspension of the rules” procedures
in 1982 (H.R. 6782) and 2000 (H.R. 4601, H.R. 4866, H.R. 5173, and H.R. 5203).  For
information on “suspension of the rules” procedures, see CRS Report RL32474, Suspension
of the Rules in the House of Representatives, by Thomas P. Carr.  The House considered a
reconciliation measure by unanimous consent in 1982 (H.R. 6955).  In that case, to facilitate
a conference with the Senate, the measure merged the text of four reconciliation bills
previously passed by the House.
All special rules waived one or more points of order against the consideration
of the reconciliation bill, the bill itself, or a floor amendment.  In most cases, the
special rule waived all points of order against the reconciliation bill.  Two special
rules waived certain points of order against the reconciliation bill except for certain
provisions in the bill.40  In addition, most special rules waived all points of order
against the floor amendments, including amendments in the nature of a substitute,
made in order by the special rule.
Finally, all the special rules providing for the consideration of a reconciliation
measure provided for the offering of a motion to recommit.  A motion to recommit
may be offered with or without instructions.  Most special rules allowed the motion
with instructions.  Four special rules, however, explicitly prohibited any motion to
recommit that contained instructions.41
Floor Consideration:  Debate and Amendment
The House floor consideration of a reconciliation measure, as mentioned above,
usually is governed by a special rule.  Of the 29 reconciliation measures considered
on the House floor during the period covering 1980 to 2003, 23 measures were
considered under a special rule.  Of the remaining six reconciliation measures, five
measures were considered under “suspension of the rules” procedures and one was
considered by unanimous consent.42  This section discusses the consideration of
reconciliation measures under a special rule.
During the House floor consideration of a reconciliation measure under a special
rule, at least three key elements can have a substantive impact on the measure:
amendments, points of order, and motions to recommit the measure.  The historical
experience of the House regarding each of these actions is discussed below.
Consideration and Disposition of Amendments.  The special rule
providing for the consideration of a reconciliation measure limited the consideration
of floor amendments to those made in order by the special rule.  In only one instance,
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43 In 1982, during the consideration of H.R. 6812, Representative St. Germain asked
unanimous consent to offer an amendment to a substitute amendment made in order by the
rule.  No objection was made and thus Representative St. Germain was able to offer the
amendment.  See Congressional Record, vol. 128, Aug. 5, 1982, pp. 19653-19654.
44 In 1986, during the consideration of H.R. 5300, Representative Wylie asked unanimous
consent to modify his amendment made in order by the rule.  An objection was made by
Representative Bill Gray, the then-Chairman of the House Budget Committee and thus the
modification was not allowed.  See Congressional Record, vol. 132, Sept. 24, 1986, pp.
25892-25893.
45 For a general description of points of order in the House, see CRS Report 98-307,  Points
of Order, Rulings, and Appeals in the House of Representatives, by Paul Rundquist.
46 For more detailed information on these points of order and their application, see CRS
Report 97-865, Points of Order in the Congressional Budget Process, by James V. Saturno.
a Member offered an amendment not made in order by the rule.43  In most cases, a
Member offered the amendments made in order by the rule.  The number of
amendments offered to a reconciliation bill ranged from one (eight times) to 10
(once).
In six cases, an amendment made in order by the rule was not offered or was
withdrawn by a Member.  In one of these cases, a Member attempted to modify his
amendment prior to offering it but was unsuccessful; consequently, he did not offer
his original amendment made in order by the rule.44
With regard to 13 reconciliation measures, one or more amendments were
adopted upon the adoption of the special rule; four of these amendments were
amendments in the nature of a substitute to the reconciliation bill.
Overall, of the 30 floor amendments offered to reconciliation measures, 19
amendments were agreed to and 11 amendments were rejected (see Table 6).  This
overall success of amendments, however, masks the variation over the years.  In the
early 1980s, for example, almost all of the amendments offered to the reconciliation
measures were agreed to (between 1980 and 1985, 16 of the 19 floor amendments
were agreed to).  Since 1985, only eight of the 21 floor amendments to reconciliation
measures were agreed to.  Moreover, over half (five) of these eight floor amendments
were offered to one reconciliation measure (H.R. 3299 in 1989).
Raising and Sustaining Points of Order.  Any Member may make a point
of order against a pending matter (e.g., a provision in a bill or an amendment) on the
grounds that it violates a rule of the House.45  Unless a special rule waives the
relevant points of order, a reconciliation measure and amendments thereto are subject
to the Standing Rules of the House, such as the germaneness requirement under
clause 7 of Rule XVI.
In addition, as a budgetary measure, a reconciliation bill is subject to the budget
enforcement procedures associated with the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and
the annual budget resolution.46  In particular, a reconciliation measure and any
amendments thereto must not cause the aggregate spending and revenue levels
(Section 311), and any committees’ spending allocations (Section 302) associated
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Motions to Recommit in the House, by Stanley Bach.
with the annual budget resolution, to be exceeded.  Under Section 310(d)(1) of the
1974 act, amendments to a reconciliation measure also must be deficit neutral to the
bill.
Most of the special rules providing for the consideration of a reconciliation
measure, however, waived one or more points of order against the bill and floor
amendments made in order.  Therefore, while various provisions in the reconciliation
bills or amendments offered thereto might have violated certain points of order under
the Standing Rules of the House or the 1974 act, the special rule prohibited a
Member from raising such points of order.
Two special rules, as mentioned above, made exceptions to the waiver of certain
points of order.  In each of these cases, Members raised points of order against the
unprotected provisions during the consideration of the reconciliation measure.
In 1985, for example, the special rule providing for the consideration of H.R.
3500, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, waived any points of order
under clauses 5(a) and (b) of Rule XXI (now clauses 4 and 5(a) of Rule XXI) against
the bill except for certain provisions.  Clause 5(a) of Rule XXI prohibited an
appropriation in legislation reported by a committee not having jurisdiction to report
appropriations.  Clause 5(b) of Rule XXI prohibited a tax measure reported by a
committee not having jurisdiction to report a tax measure.
During the consideration of H.R. 3500, Representative Sidney Yates raised a
point of order against one of the unprotected provisions that contained an
appropriation in a title of the reconciliation bill reported by a committee not having
jurisdiction to report an appropriation.  In addition, Representative Dan
Rostenkowski raised points of order against two unprotected provisions that
contained a tax measure in a title of the bill reported by a committee not having
jurisdiction to report tax measures.  In all three cases, the points of order were
sustained and thus the violating provisions were stricken from the bill.47
Motions to Recommit.  Under the Standing Rules of the House, one motion
to recommit a reconciliation measure may be offered by a Member opposed to the
measure, with preference given to a Member of the minority party, after the previous
question has been ordered on the measure but before the vote on final passage (House
Rule XIX, clause 2).48  The motion may be made with or without instructions.
A motion to recommit with instructions is debatable for 10 minutes, equally
divided between the proponent and an opponent of the motion; this debate time may
be extended to an hour if requested by the majority floor manager.  A motion to
recommit without instructions is not debatable.
All special rules providing for the consideration of a reconciliation measure
allowed for the offering of a motion to recommit.  Members offered 16 motions to
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recommit 15 reconciliation bills.  Almost all of these motions to recommit (13 of the
16) included instructions.  All of the motions to recommit with or without
instructions were rejected.  In one case, in 2003, a motion to recommit with
instructions fell on a point of order that it was not germane to the bill.49
Subsequently, another motion to recommit with instructions was offered; it was
rejected.
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H.R. 6782a Veterans’ Affairs H.Rept. 97-
660
07-23-82 07-27-82 400-0
H.R. 6862a [none] 08-03-82 268-128





H.R. 6892a Agriculture H.Rept. 97-
687
08-02-82 08-10-82 268-121






















Deficit Reduction Act of
1984
(P.L. 98-369; 07-18-84)

















H.R. 3128 Ways and Means H.Rept. 99-
241, Part I
07-31-85 10-31-85 245-174





















































































Balanced Budget Act of
1995
(vetoed; 12-06-95)

















Balanced Budget Act of
1997
(P.L. 105-33; 08-05-97)
H.R. 2015 Budget H.Rept.
105-149
06-24-97 06-25-97 270-162
Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997
(P.L. 105-34; 08-05-97)
















Relief Act of 1999
(vetoed; 09-23-99)









H.R. 4810 [none] 07-12-00 269-159




[did not become law] H.R. 4866 [none] 07-18-00 422-1






















H.R. 1836 [none] 05-16-01 230-197
2004 108th
(First)




H.R. 2 Ways and Means H.Rept.
108-94
05-08-03 05-09-03 222-202
Source:  Prepared by the Congressional Research Service.
a The first four measures listed, H.R. 6782, H.R. 6812, H.R. 6862, and H.R. 6892, were considered and passed separately by the House, but later were incorporated
into H.R. 6955, which became the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982 (except for H.R. 6782, which became public law separately, P.L. 97-306).
b The House Budget Committee issued a report,  Efforts to Reduce the Federal Deficit (H.Rept. 98-673, Apr. 10, 1984) pertaining to the reconciliation recommendations
contained in H.R. 5394, but the report did not officially accompany that measure.
c Following its passage by the House, H.R. 3500 was incorporated into H.R. 3128 by H.Res. 330.
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Question Special Rule Date
1981 96th
(Second)
H.R. 7765 H.Res. 776 H.Rept. 96-126 230-157 206-182 09-04-80
1982 97th
(First)




H.R. 6782 [suspension procedure]
H.R. 6862 H.Res. 536 H.Rept. 97-672  — 240-170 07-28-82
H.R. 6812 H.Res. 547 H.Rept. 97-692  — Voice 08-05-82
H.R. 6892 H.Res. 551 H.Rept. 97-702  — 230-156 08-10-82
H.R. 6955 [unanimous consent]
1984 98th
(First)
H.R. 4169 H.Res. 344 H.Rept. 98-437  — 224-198 10-25-83
H.R. 4170 H.Res. 376 H.Rept. 98-555  — 204-214 11-17-83
98th
(Second)












Question Special Rule Date
1985 98th
(Second)
H.R. 5394 H.Res. 483 H.Rept. 98-672  — 217-196 04-12-84
1986 99th
(First)
H.R. 3500 H.Res. 296 H.Rept. 99-310  — 230-190 10-23-85
H.R. 3128 H.Res. 301 H.Rept. 99-338 219-205 Voice 10-31-85
H.R. 3128 H.Res. 330 H.Rept. 99-410  — Voice 12-05-85
1987 99th
(Second)
H.R. 5300 H.Res. 558 H.Rept. 99-871 216-196 255-157 09-24-86
1988 100th
(First)
H.R. 3545 H.Res. 296 H.Rept. 100-406  — 203-217 10-29-87
H.Res. 298 H.Rept.
100-411




H.R. 3299 H.Res. 245 H.Rept. 101-248  — 316-109 09-26-89
H.Res. 249 H.Rept.
101-261
 — 371-49 09-27-89
1991 101st
(Second)












Question Special Rule Date
1994 103rd
(First)
H.R. 2264 H.Res. 186 H.Rept. 103-112 252-178 236-194 05-27-93
1996 104th
(First)
H.R. 2491 H.Res. 245 H.Rept. 104-292 228-191 235-185 10-26-95
1997 104th
(Second)
H.R. 3734 H.Res. 482 H.Rept. 104-686  — 258-54 07-18-96
1998 105th
(First)
H.R. 2015 H.Res. 174 H.Rept. 105-152 222-204 228-200 06-25-97
H.R. 2014 H.Res. 174 H.Rept. 105-152 222-204 228-200 06-25-97
2000 106th
(First)
H.R. 2488 H.Res. 256 H.Rept. 106-246  — 219-208 07-22-99
2001 106th
(Second)
H.R. 4810 H.Res. 545 H.Rept. 106-545  — 407-16 07-12-00
H.R. 4601 [suspension procedure]
H.R. 4866 [suspension procedure]
H.R. 5173 [suspension procedure]












Question Special Rule Date
2002 107th
(First)
H.R. 1836 H.Res. 142 H.Rept. 107-68  — 220-207 05-16-01
2004 108th
(First)
H.R. 2 H.Res. 227 H.Rept. 108-94 219-203 220-203 05-09-03
Source:  Prepared by the Congressional Research Service.
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Omnibus Reconciliation Act of
1980
(P.L. 96-499; 12-05-80)
H.R. 7765 Giaimo Agreed to Voice
Vanick Agreed to Voice






H.R. 3982 Latta (en bloc) Agreed to 217-211
Broyhill Withdrawn  — 










H.R. 6862 Derwinski MTR
(with instructions)
Rejected 160-236
H.R. 6812 St. Germain Agreed to Voice
Stanton Agreed to 337-69








Amendments and Motions to Recommit (MTR)
Sponsor Disposition Vote
H.R. 6892 Agriculture (en bloc) Agreed to Voice








H.R. 4169 Jones Agreed to 245-176b






Deficit Reduction Act of 1984
(P.L. 98-369; 07-18-84)
H.R. 4170 Ways and Means ANS Agreed to Voice






















Reconciliation Act of 1985
(P.L. 99-272; 04-07-86)
H.R. 3500 Latta
(as modified by unanimous
consent)
Rejected 209-219
Fazio Agreed to 222-205
























H.R. 3299 Roukema Agreed to 250-173
Dorgan Agreed to 390-36












Donnelly Agreed to 360-66
Panetta Agreed to Voice
Stark Rejected 156-269










H.R. 5835 Rostenkowski (en bloc) Agreed to 238-192




















Balanced Budget Act of 1995
(vetoed; 12-06-95)






Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996
(P.L. 104-193; 08-22-96)
H.R. 3734 Ney Agreed to 239-184






Balanced Budget Act of 1997
(P.L. 105-33; 08-05-97)
H.R. 2015 Brown (OH) MTR
(with instructions)
Rejected 207-223
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
(P.L. 105-34; 08-05-97)






Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act
of 1999
(vetoed; 09-23-99)
















Reconciliation Act of 2000
(vetoed; 08-05-00)




[did not become law] H.R. 4601 [none]
[did not become law] H.R. 4866 [none]
[did not become law] H.R. 5173 [none]
[did not become law] H.R. 5203 [none]
2002 107th
(First)
Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001
(P.L. 107-16; 06-07-01)
H.R. 1836 Rangel ANS Rejected 188-239
2004 108th
(First)
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2003
(P.L. 108-27; 05-28-03)
H.R. 2 Rangel MTR
(with instructions)






Source:  Prepared by the Congressional Research Service.
Note:  “ANS” refers to an amendment in the nature of a substitute.
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a The previous question on the amendment was agreed to by a vote of 215-212.
b The amendment was agreed to in the Committee of the Whole on a division vote of 31-24.  The amendment, subsequently, was agreed to in the House on a vote of 245-176, as
indicated.
c The ruling of the chair was appealed and a motion to table the appeal was agreed to by a vote of 222-202.
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51 For an example of committee rules, see the rules of the Senate Finance Committee for the
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151, Jan. 25, 2005, at pp. S425-S426.
Initial Consideration in the Senate
The initial consideration of reconciliation measures in the Senate is potentially
a complex process that parallels House action in some respects, but differs
significantly in others.  Four aspects of Senate action at this stage of the
reconciliation process are addressed in this section:  (1) the development of
legislative recommendations by the instructed committees; (2) the preparation of an
omnibus measure by the Senate Budget Committee; (3) floor consideration of
reconciliation legislation; and (4) the operation of the Senate’s “Byrd rule.”
Development of Legislative Recommendations by the
Instructed Committees
The reconciliation directives contained in the budget resolution, as finally
agreed to by the House and Senate, inform each instructed Senate committee as to the
type and scope of the legislative recommendations it must develop in order to comply
with the directives.  In addition, the reconciliation directives include a deadline for
the submission of legislative recommendations to the Budget Committee or the
reporting of legislation directly to the Senate.
Whether a committee has been instructed to submit legislative recommendations
to the Senate Budget Committee for inclusion in an omnibus reconciliation measure,
or has been instructed to report a reconciliation measure directly to the Senate, it
develops its recommendations in generally the same manner as it develops other
legislation.50  In doing so, the committee must adhere to the pertinent requirements
in the Standing Rules of the Senate, as well as it own committee rules, including
rules regarding the reporting of a measure or matter.51
Relationship With the Budget Committee.  Prior to the commencement
of work by the instructed committees on their reconciliation recommendations, the
Senate Budget Committee usually sends a set of “guidelines” to the chairman and
ranking member of each committee.  The guidelines summarize the applicable
procedural requirements stemming from the budget resolution containing the
reconciliation directives and pertinent provisions of the Congressional Budget Act
of 1974, and provide additional information on related matters, such as scoring
conventions that will be used to evaluate the reconciliation recommendations.  The
Budget Committee also may advise each instructed committee on drafting
considerations (e.g., the number of the title or titles in the measure for the
committee’s recommendations) to avoid confusion when compiling the committee
recommendations into a single measure.
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In most instances, the instructed committees maintain an ongoing relationship
with the Budget Committee during the process of developing their legislative
recommendations, at least informally at the staff level.  Consultations occur between
the committees to foster a clear understanding of procedural requirements, to assess
potential compliance issues with the aim of avoiding them, and for other reasons.  In
addition, the instructed committees regularly consult with CBO and, if appropriate,
the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) on the budgetary implications of policy
options and other budget-related assessments, and seek appropriate guidance and
support from the Parliamentarian, Legislative Counsel, and other offices.
Hearings, Markup, and Reporting or Submission of
Recommendations.  While committees typically are afforded a certain amount of
flexibility in conducting their legislative activities, Senate Rule XXVI, entitled
“Committee Procedure,” lays out basic requirements with regard to such matters as
the scheduling of meetings and hearings, quorums, openness, and voting and
reporting requirements.
As in the case of other legislation, instructed committees often hold hearings
prior to marking up their legislative recommendations.  The Senate Finance
Committee, for example, held multiple hearings at the full committee and
subcommittee level before marking up a revenue reconciliation measure on June 19,
1997.  Over a period spanning from February 4 through June 5 of that year, the
committee held 10 full committee and two subcommittee hearings on topics related
to the reconciliation recommendations, covering such matters as the status of the
Airport and Airway Trust Fund, Individual Retirement Account proposals, capital
gains and losses, the Administration’s FY1998 budget, and tax proposals related to
education, health care, and small business.52
Committees may proceed by marking up a bill that already has been introduced.
The most common approach, however, is for the committee to originate legislation
in the markup, such as by considering a “chairman’s mark,” which may be altered by
the adoption of amendments in committee.
Before an instructed committee can submit reconciliation legislation to the
Budget Committee or report it directly to the Senate, it must meet to consider and
approve the legislation, including relevant amendments and motions that may be
offered, and then order the legislation reported by a majority vote.  A majority of the
committee must be physically present in order to vote to report the legislation;
otherwise, a point of order may be raised on the Senate floor to prevent its
consideration.53
Committee Report or Submission Requirements.  In addition to
complying with reporting requirements under Senate Rule XXVI, the committee
must comply with reporting requirements in Section 308 (2 U.S.C. 637), Section 402
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October 1995, pp. 11-23.
(2 U.S.C. 653), and Section 423 (2 U.S.C. 658b) of the 1974 act.  These sections
pertain to various analyses of budgetary legislation, including cost estimates and
assessments of unfunded mandates prepared by CBO and, in the case of revenue
legislation, the JCT.  The CBO and JCT estimates must be included in committee
reports only if they are available in a timely manner.
Further, with respect to revenue legislation, Section 4022(b) of the Internal
Revenue Service Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-206) requires the
inclusion of a tax complexity analysis in the report accompanying any revenue
measure reported by the House Ways and Means Committee, the Senate Finance
Committee, or a conference committee, if the measure directly or indirectly amends
the Internal Revenue Code and has widespread applicability to individuals or small
businesses.
Committee submissions to the Budget Committee usually consist of four
required elements.  In addition to the legislative text, the submission includes the
committee report language, the CBO or JCT estimates, and a transmittal letter signed
by the chairman of the instructed committee.  In many instances, the ranking member
of the instructed committee signs the transmittal letter as well.
Like committee reports on other measures, the committee report language
accompanying reconciliation legislation may include additional, supplemental, or
dissenting views, which allow committee members individually, or as part of a group,
to amplify their views, register their concerns, or express their dissent regarding part
or all of the legislation.  In the case of 1995 reconciliation legislation, for example,
eight minority members of the Budget Committee signed a statement collectively
expressing their views.54
On occasion, the CBO or JCT estimates may not be prepared in time for
inclusion in the committee’s submission and are omitted, but usually become
available in time for inclusion in the Budget Committee’s report on the omnibus
reconciliation measure.  On other occasions, the instructed committee may include
CBO or JCT estimates that are preliminary and are revised later.
While a committee that is participating in the development of an omnibus
reconciliation measure must submit its legislative recommendations to the Budget
Committee, it may also publish them separately or report them as separate legislation
altogether.
Senate committee actions that led to the enactment of two reconciliation acts in
one year during the 105th Congress, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, illustrate the potential complexity involved.  The
FY1998 budget resolution provided for a revenue reconciliation act and an omnibus
spending reconciliation act.
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The initial Senate version of the spending reconciliation measure, the Balanced
Budget Act (S. 947), originated in the Budget Committee and was reported on June
20, 1997.  In lieu of a written report on the bill, the Budget Committee issued a 241-
page committee print containing the transmittal letters, report language, and cost
estimates provided by the eight instructed Senate committees.55  The print included
(on pages 71-197) a 126-page submission from the Senate Finance Committee.  As
a supplement to the Budget Committee’s print, the Finance Committee issued its own
474-page committee print, explaining its spending reconciliation recommendations
in more detail.56
The initial Senate version of the revenue reconciliation measure, the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997 (S. 949), was reported directly to the Senate by the Finance
Committee (because it was the sole committee subject to revenue reconciliation
directives) on June 20.  The committee issued a written report to accompany the
measure.57
Preparation of an Omnibus Measure by the Senate Budget
Committee
In the course of preparing an omnibus reconciliation measure, the Budget
Committee’s task usually is described as a “ministerial function.”  Under Section
310(b)(2) of the 1974 act, after receiving the legislative recommendations of the
instructed committees, the Budget Committee must report omnibus reconciliation
legislation carrying out the recommendations “without any substantive revision.”
Ensuring Accuracy and Completeness.  Although this task may be
described correctly as being ministerial, the Budget Committee still is faced with
several issues at this point.  First, the Budget Committee must endeavor to ensure
that all responses from instructed committees are complete and accurate.  As
indicated previously, the Budget Committee secures any CBO or JCT estimates that
were not prepared in time for inclusion with the committee submissions, or secures
final estimates in place of preliminary ones.
In order to ensure accuracy, the Budget Committee from time to time has made
technical corrections in the submissions at the request of the instructed committees.
In the case of reconciliation legislation in 1996 dealing with welfare reform, for
example, both of the instructed committees asked the Budget Committee to make
corrections in their previous submissions.  On July 9, 1996, Chairman Richard Lugar
and Ranking Member Patrick Leahy of the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry Committee sent a letter to Budget Committee Chairman Pete Domenici,
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1987 (p. S13111).
63 For one Budget Committee chairman’s interpretation of the committee’s discretion, see
the remarks of Senator James Sasser in the Congressional Record (daily ed.), vol. 134, of
Oct. 4, 1989, p. S12589.
with technical corrections to four provisions in the June 28 submission attached.58
Similarly, on July 15, Chairman William Roth of the Finance Committee sent a letter
to Chairman Domenici notifying him that the July 11 submission “inadvertently
included a change to the child care section of the bill which was not actually made
by the Committee.”59  The Budget Committee indicated that it had made the changes
requested by both committees.  It was the instructed committees, and not the Budget
Committee, that had the authority to make these changes.
Dealing With Tardy Responses.  A second issue faced by the Budget
Committee is what to do if one or more committees does not submit its
recommendations by the deadline.  The initial practice of the Senate was to extend
the deadline when the Budget Committee felt that such action was warranted.  This
practice was motivated by the view that including tardy committee submissions could
“taint” the reconciliation measure, thereby causing it to lose its privilege and the
protection of expedited procedures.  In 1985, for example, the Senate extended the
September 27 deadline set in the FY1986 budget resolution to October 1 by
unanimous consent in order to accommodate the Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs Committee.60  In some instances, the deadline was extended in a series of
tightly constrained steps.  In 1986, for example, the deadline of July 25 set in the
FY1987 budget resolution was extended to 6:00 p.m. on July 29, to 12:00 noon on
July 30, and then to 3:30 p.m. on that same day, July 30.61  Finally, the deadline has
been extended by larger margins; the July 28 deadline in the FY1988 budget
resolution was extended to September 29 and then to October 19.62
Under more recent practice, the Budget Committee may be afforded some
discretion in awaiting the responses of tardy committees in order to include them in
the omnibus reconciliation measure.  While the budget resolution provides a deadline
for the submissions by the instructed committees, it does not impose a reporting
deadline on the Budget Committee.  Under Section 310(b)(2) of the 1974 act, the
Budget Committee is obliged to report the omnibus reconciliation measure only
“upon receiving all such recommendations.”  Consequently, the Budget Committee’s
obligation to report does not ripen until all recommendations have been received,
even tardy ones.63
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(continued...)
Nonetheless, the Budget Committee is expected to report the omnibus
reconciliation measure in a reasonably prompt manner.  Accordingly, when faced
with lingering delay in the responses by one or more instructed committees, it may
choose to report the omnibus reconciliation measure without the responses and seek
a remedy for the omissions during floor consideration.
Evaluating Compliance.  A third task facing the Budget Committee at this
stage of the reconciliation process, and perhaps the most important one, is evaluating
compliance by the responding committees.  Compliance may be judged by several
criteria.  First and foremost, the Budget Committee assesses whether each instructed
committee has met the goals laid out in the reconciliation directives.  In the case of
each committee, the estimated levels of spending changes (and, if appropriate,
revenue changes and debt-limit changes) that would be achieved for each time period
are measured against the instructed levels.
Although the Budget Committee and each instructed committee receives costs
estimates from CBO and the JCT, it is the Budget Committee’s responsibility and
prerogative to assess committee compliance on the basis of spending or revenue
levels.  In measuring compliance, the Budget Committee sometimes will make
adjustments to the estimates provided by CBO or the JCT.  One such adjustment,
which occurred in 1995, involved a change in the enactment date assumed by CBO,
which shortened the time available in FY1996 for the sale of the Naval Petroleum
Reserves.  As a consequence of this change, CBO judged that the sale could not be
completed in FY1996 and reduced the savings attributed to the Armed Services
Committee accordingly.  As explained by the Senate Budget Committee:
The FY1996 budget resolution assumed an October 1, 1995
enactment date and the reconciliation instructions to committees were
based on this enactment date.  Due to the delay of some of the
committee’s submissions and other factors, CBO is currently using a
November 15, 1995 enactment date.  As a result, some committees
followed the assumptions in the budget resolution and still failed to
meet their fiscal year 1996 reconciliation instruction because of this
change in the assumption on the enactment date....  However, if a
committee follows the assumptions in the budget resolution and fails
to meet its instructions for fiscal year 1996 solely because of an
assumption on the enactment date, the Senate Budget Committee will
hold the committee harmless and will score the committee as
achieving its instruction.  Therefore, with this adjustment, the Armed
Services Committee has complied with the budget resolution’s
reconciliation instructions for FY1996.64
A second criterion for determining compliance involves the “fungibility rule,”
which is set forth in Section 310(c) of the 1974 act.65  The purpose of the rule is to
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66 Senate Budget Committee, Budget Process Law Annotated, S.Prt. 103-49, October 1993,
p. 168 (annotations by William G. Dauster, Chief Counsel).
allow some flexibility in the response of a committee instructed to change both
spending and revenues.  The fungibility rule may not apply if revenue and spending
changes are reported in separate reconciliation measures pursuant to separate
directives.
In sum, the fungibility rule:  (1) applies to any Senate (or House) committee that
is subject to reconciliation directives in a budget resolution requiring it to recommend
reconciliation legislation changing both spending and revenues; (2) deems any such
committee to be in compliance with its reconciliation directives if its recommended
legislation does not cause either the spending changes or the revenue changes to
exceed or fall below the directives by more than 20% of the sum of the two types of
changes, and the total amount of changes recommended is not less than the total
amount of changes that were directed; and (3) authorizes the chairman of the Senate
Budget Committee to file appropriate adjustments in the levels in the budget
resolution, and committee spending allocations thereunder, upon the exercise of the
rule, and requires any committee receiving revised spending allocations to promptly
report Section 302(b) suballocations.
The operation of this rule in the Senate was described in 1993 in a print of the
Senate Budget Committee, as follows:
For an example of the rule in operation, take the case of a budget resolution
that instructs a committee to achieve $3 million in outlay reductions and $7
million in revenue increases, for a total of $10 million in deficit reduction.  By
virtue of this section, that committee may permissibly achieve outlay reductions
as low as $1 million ($3 million minus 20 percent of $10 million, or $2 million),
as long as it achieves a total of at least $10 million in deficit reduction by also
achieving at least $9 million in revenue increases.  Alternatively, the committee
may achieve revenue increases as low as $5 million ($7 million minus 20 percent
of $10 million, or $2 million), as long as it achieves a total of at least $10 million
in deficit reduction by also achieving outlay reductions of at least $5 million.66
In its current form, the fungibility rule authorizes the chairman of the Senate
Budget Committee to file changes in budget resolution levels, and committee
spending allocations thereunder, whenever the rule is exercised, and to require that
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any committee receiving revised spending allocations promptly report Section 302(b)
suballocations.67
As Senate and House rules grant jurisdiction over revenue matters primarily to
the Senate Finance Committee and House Ways and Means Committee, respectively,
these are the two main committees to which the fungibility rule applies.
Finally, a third criterion for assessing committee compliance with the
reconciliation directives is the Senate’s “Byrd rule,” which is discussed in detail
below.  Briefly, the rule bars the inclusion of matter in reconciliation legislation that
is extraneous to the purposes of the reconciliation directives.
The Parliamentarian also plays a role in assessing compliance with
reconciliation directives, determining whether provisions from the instructed
committees are within their respective jurisdictions.  Further, the Parliamentarian
determines, as a threshold matter, whether the assembled submissions from the
instructed committees constitute a reconciliation bill and, thus, whether the bill may
be considered under the expedited procedures of the reconciliation process.
While the Budget Committee must report the legislative recommendations
submitted to it, the committee need not necessarily issue a written report.  Beginning
in the late 1980s, the practice of the Senate Budget Committee has been to report
omnibus reconciliation bills without a written report.  The purpose of this practice
is to avoid both a Budget Committee rule providing for time to submit additional and
minority views, and the Senate rule requiring legislation accompanied by a written
report to lay over for a period of time before floor consideration.  The Budget
Committee usually issues a committee print explaining the legislation in lieu of a
report.
The Budget Committee, because it must report an omnibus reconciliation bill
“without any substantive revision,” may not resolve any substantive issues on non-
compliance at this point.  The Budget Committee may, however, in concert with the
leadership, evaluate strategies for remedying the non-compliance on the Senate floor
through one or more manager’s amendments or by other means.
Floor Consideration:  Debate and Amendment
The basic contours of Senate procedure for the consideration of reconciliation
measures are shaped by Section 310 of the 1974 act.  In particular, Section 310(e)
provides that the provisions of Section 305 of the act, which establish procedures for
the consideration of budget resolutions and conference reports thereon in the Senate,
shall also apply to the consideration of reconciliation measures and conference
reports thereon.  In one important exception, a 20-hour limit on debate is set for
reconciliation measures, instead of the 50-hour limit applicable to budget resolutions.
The timetable for the congressional budget process set out in Section 300 of the
1974 act indicates that Congress should complete action on any required
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reconciliation by June 15.  While Section 310(f) of the act is intended to enforce this
deadline in the House (by barring the consideration in July of an adjournment
resolution providing for the traditional August recess if the House has not completed
action), the act does not contain any comparable provision for the Senate.
Like other budgetary legislation, reconciliation measures generally must be in
compliance with budget enforcement procedures in the 1974 act and included in
annual budget resolutions.  In particular, spending levels in the measure must not
cause any committee’s spending allocations under the budget resolution to be
exceeded (Section 302), revenues levels in the measure must not drop below the
revenue floor established in the budget resolution (Section 311), and no policy or
procedural matters within the Budget Committee’s jurisdiction can be included
(Section 306), or the bill will be subject to points of order under these sections that
require a three-fifths vote to waive.
Patterns in the Consideration of Senate and House Legislation.
During the period from 1980-2004, covering budget resolutions for FY1981-FY2005,
the Senate completed action on a total of 19 reconciliation acts stemming from
reconciliation directives in budget resolutions for 17 different years (see Table 7).
In all but three of these years, the Senate considered a single reconciliation measure
in response to the reconciliation directives in the budget resolution.  In the three
remaining years, the Senate considered two different reconciliation measures each
year, resulting in the enactment of five reconciliation acts — one act in 1980 (for
FY1981) and two acts each in 1982 and 1997 (for FY1983 and FY1998).
As a general matter, the Senate initially considers a single, Senate-numbered
reconciliation measure, either an omnibus reconciliation act reported by the Budget
Committee or a reconciliation act reported by the Finance Committee.  Following the
completion of debate and amendment,  the Senate positions itself for conference with
the House by taking up the House-passed reconciliation measure, striking all after the
enacting clause, and inserting the text of the Senate-passed measure.
This procedure is especially important with respect to reconciliation measures
that affect revenues due to the requirement in the Constitution that revenue measures
originate in the House.  By passing a House-numbered bill in the final instance, the
Senate abides by the constitutional requirement.  (After the Senate considers the
Senate-numbered bill, the 1974 act would allow an additional 20 hours to consider
the House-numbered bill, but the Senate usually considered the House-numbered bill
by unanimous consent.)
Different patterns of legislative action have occurred as well.  In 1980, for
example, the Senate Budget Committee reported two different original Senate bills
carrying out revenue and spending reconciliation instructions, and the Senate
considered each of them separately.  Following their consideration, the Senate
incorporated both of the measures into the House-passed reconciliation bill.68
CRS-69












Omnibus Reconciliation Act of
1980
(P.L. 96-499; 12-05-80)
S. 2885 Budget [none] 06-26-80 06-30-80 89-0
S. 2939 Budget [none] 07-02-80 07-23-80 Voice













H.R. 3982 n/a 07-13-81 Voice
1983 97th
(Second)
Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982
(P.L. 97-248; 09-03-82)











































Reconciliation Act of 1985
(P.L. 99-272; 04-07-86)























































S. 1750 Budget [none] 10-12-89 10-12-89
10-13-89
[none]






























H.R. 2264 n/a 06-25-93 50-49
1996 104th
(First)
Balanced Budget Act of 1995
(vetoed; 12-06-95)











Reconciliation Act of 1996
(P.L. 104-193; 08-22-96)


















Balanced Budget Act of 1997
(P.L. 105-33; 08-05-97)




H.R. 2015 n/a 06-25-97 Unanimous
Consent
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
(P.L. 105-34; 08-05-97)






H.R. 2014 n/a 06-27-97 80-18
2000 106th
(First)
Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act
of 1999
(vetoed; 09-23-99)
























Reconciliation Act of 2000
(vetoed; 08-05-00)
S. 2839 Finance S.Rept. 106-
329
07-05-00 [none] [none]






Economic Growth and Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001
(P.L. 107-16; 06-07-01)
S. 896 Finance [none] 05-16-01 [none] [none]







Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2003
(P.L. 108-27; 05-28-03)
S. 1054 Finance [none] 05-13-03 05-14-03
05-15-03
[none]
H.R. 2 n/a 05-15-03 51-49
Source:  Prepared by the Congressional Research Service.
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71 See Senate action on S. 896 and H.R. 1836 in the first session of the 107th Congress, and
on S. 1054 and H.R. 2 in the first session of the 108th Congress.
On two occasions, in 1982 and 1997, the Senate considered separate revenue
and spending reconciliation acts that each became law.69  Three of the four measures
were original Senate bills reported by the Budget Committee (two bills) or the
Finance Committee (one bill), but in the remaining instance the Finance Committee
reported a House-passed bill instead of an original Senate bill.70
In 2001 and 2003, the Finance Committee reported original Senate bills carrying
out revenue reconciliation instructions, but the Senate did not consider them.
Instead, the Senate considered House-passed reconciliation bills under an accelerated
schedule.71
The Senate usually completes initial action on reconciliation measures over a
period of two to four days.  In 1980, the Senate devoted only one day each to the
initial consideration of two reconciliation bills, but in 1985 it considered a
reconciliation measure for eight days.
Initiating Consideration and Controlling Time.  Although not explicitly
stated in the 1974 act, reconciliation measures are privileged measures.  Accordingly,
the motion to proceed to the consideration of a reconciliation measure is not
debatable.  In practice, most reconciliation measures are laid before the Senate by
unanimous consent.
A reconciliation measure does not need to lie over on the calendar for one
legislative day, but if such legislation is accompanied by a written report, the report
must be available for 48 hours before the measure can be considered.  As stated
previously, the usual practice of the Budget Committee since the late 1980s has been
to report omnibus reconciliation bills without a written report, issuing a committee
print in lieu of a report.  The Finance Committee has been instructed to report
legislation directly to the Senate on several occasions in recent years, sometimes
issuing a written report and sometimes not doing so.
Reconciliation legislation is subject to a 20-hour debate limitation.  Debate on
first degree amendments is limited to two hours, and debate on second degree
amendments and debatable motions or appeals is limited to one hour.  In practice,
debate time may vary from these limits, pursuant to unanimous consent agreements.
Control of time under the 20-hour limit is equally divided between, and
controlled by, the majority leader and the minority leader or their designees.  The
chairman and ranking member of the Budget Committee usually are designated to
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serve as floor managers and to control the time.  With respect to amendments (and
debatable motions and appeals), time is divided equally and controlled by the Senator
who proposed the amendment and the majority manager (or, if the majority manager
favors the amendment, the minority manager).
Not all actions pertaining to a reconciliation measure are counted under the 20-
hour time limit.  Debate on the measure, all amendments thereto, debatable motions
and appeals, and time used in quorum calls (except for those that precede a rollcall
vote) is counted under the limit, but time used to read amendments, to vote, or to
establish a quorum prior to a rollcall vote is not counted, absent a unanimous consent
agreement to the contrary.  Therefore, it is possible, especially with the consideration
of a large number of amendments under a “vote-arama” situation (discussed below),
for consideration to extend well beyond 20 hours.  Conversely, because the time for
debate may be reduced by yielding back time, by unanimous consent, or by a
nondebatable motion, the consideration of a reconciliation measure may not consume
the full 20 hours.
Restrictions on Amendments and Motions to Recommit.  There are
several restrictions on the consideration of amendments.  First, as provided in Section
305(b)(2) of the 1974 act, amendments must be germane (the germaneness
requirement also applies to amendments to budget resolutions).72  While certain
amendments are per se germane (e.g., an amendment to strike, or to change numbers
or dates), the germaneness of an amendment typically is determined on a case-by-
case basis if a point of order is raised.
Once matter has been stricken from the measure by amendment, the matter can
no longer be used to justify germaneness.  Conversely, matter added to the measure
by amendment can be used as the basis for additional amendments to be deemed
germane.
An important exception to the germaneness requirement is made in connection
with a motion to recommit with instructions intended to bring a committee’s
recommendations into full compliance.  Although the motion itself must be germane,
the amendment reported back by the instructed committee is not subject to a
germaneness requirement.  This practice recognizes the fact that in order to make the
changes in spending or revenues necessary to achieve full compliance, it may be
necessary to address matter not included in the instructed committee’s original
recommendations.
Section 310(d) prohibits the consideration of any amendment that would cause
the reconciliation measure to reduce outlays by less than the amount instructed, or
would cause it to increase revenues by less than the amount instructed, unless the
resulting deficit increase is offset.  The prohibition does not interfere, however, with
a motion to strike, regardless of that motion’s effect on the deficit.
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Section 310(g) bars the consideration of any reconciliation legislation, including
any amendment thereto or conference report thereon, “that contains recommendations
with respect to” Social Security.  For purposes of these provision, Social Security is
considered to include the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI)
program established under Title II of the Social Security Act; it does not include
Medicare or other programs established as part of that act.
Finally, Section 313, the Senate’s “Byrd rule,” prohibits the consideration of any
reconciliation legislation, including amendments, that include extraneous matter (see
discussion below).  One provision of the Byrd rule buttresses the prohibition against
considering recommendations affecting Social Security set forth in Section 310(g).
Each of the restrictions discussed above requires an affirmative vote of three-
fifths of the membership (60 Senators, if no seats are vacant) to waive or to appeal
the ruling of the chair.
An amendment fashioned to avoid one restriction still may run afoul of another.
An amendment may be germane, for example, yet violate the Byrd rule because it has
no budgetary effect and therefore is extraneous.
Motions to recommit, as previously indicated, afford a means of bringing
committee recommendations into full compliance.  Section 305(b)(5) of the 1974 act
prohibits any motion to recommit, except for a motion to recommit with instructions
to report back within no more than three days.  In practice, such motions usually
require the instructed committee to report back “forthwith.”  While the committee
named in the instructions may not be amended, the legislative language included in
the instructions is amendable in two degrees.  If not necessary to bring a committee
into compliance, the amendments proposed by a motion to recommit must be
germane.
“Vote-arama”.  The number of amendments offered to reconciliation
measures generally has increased over the history of the reconciliation process.  Only
a few amendments were offered to the earliest reconciliation bills, but dozens of
amendments have been offered to reconciliation bills in recent years.
When the 20-hour debate limit has been reached, Senators may continue to
consider amendments and motions to recommit with instructions (and to take other
actions as well), but they may not debate them unless unanimous consent is granted.
The circumstance under which debate time on a reconciliation measure (or budget
resolution) has expired but amendments and motions continue to be considered has
come to be known as “vote-arama.”  As a general matter, accelerated voting
procedures sometimes are put into effect under a vote-arama scenario, allowing two
minutes of debate per amendment for explanation and a 10-minute limit per vote.
During the consideration of the three most recent reconciliation measures, in
2000, 2001, and 2003, the Senate considered 162 amendments and motions to
recommit (38 in 2000, 59 in 2001, and 65 in 2003).  Many of the amendments and
motions were considered and disposed of under a vote-arama, as discussed in more
detail below.
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Senator Reid indicated that he had yielded back all of his time; see the Congressional
Record (daily ed.), vol. 147, May 21, 2001, at p. S5246.
74 Ibid., p. S5248.
75 Congressional Record (daily ed.), vol. 149, May 15, 2003, p. S6196.  The Senate did not
vote on any amendments on May 14.
! Marriage Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2000 (vetoed).  The
Senate considered H.R. 4810 (S. 2839) on July 14, 17, and 18, 2000.
Under a series of unanimous consent agreements, 37 amendments
and one motion to recommit were offered and debated on the first
day of consideration, July 14, without any final action being taken
on them.  On the second day of consideration, July 17, the Senate
took up these amendments for disposition at 6:15 p.m., with two
minutes of debate time available for explanation of each amendment.
This procedure was employed on the following day, July 18, as well,
ending with final passage of the bill.  Over the two days, 37
amendments and one motion to recommit were considered under this
procedure; 10 amendments were adopted, three amendments (and
one motion to recommit) were rejected, seven amendments fell on
a point of order, and 17 amendments were withdrawn.
! Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (P.L.
107-16).  The Senate considered H.R. 1836 on May 17, 21, 22, and
23, 2001.  On the second day of consideration, May 21, after the 20-
hour limit on debate apparently had expired,73 the Senate took up
and disposed of a series of amendments under a unanimous consent
agreement, propounded by Senator Lott, under which the votes
would be limited to 10 minutes each, with two minutes before each
vote for an explanation.74  This procedure was employed on the
following two days of consideration, May 22 and May 23, as well,
ending with final passage of the bill.  Under this procedure, over the
three-day period, the Senate considered 59 amendments and motions
to recommit; eight were adopted, 20 were rejected, 26 fell on a point
of order, and five were withdrawn.  Thirty-five of these 59
amendments and motions to recommit had been offered, considered,
and temporarily laid aside prior to the expiration of the 20-hour
limit.  Subsequently, these 35 amendments and motions to recommit
were considered under the accelerated voting procedures; three were
adopted, 14 amendments were rejected, 13 fell on a point of order,
and five were withdrawn.
! Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-
27).  The Senate considered S. 1054 on May 14 and 15, 2003.  On
the first day of consideration, the Senate agreed by unanimous
consent that the 20-hour limit on debate be expired and that the
Senate proceed to vote on amendments at the beginning of the
following day.75  At the end of May 14, Senator Grassley announced
that during consideration of the amendments on May 15, all votes
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after the first vote would be limited to 10 minutes each.76  On May
15, the Senate considered 65 amendments; 30 amendments were
adopted, nine amendments were rejected, 19 amendments fell on a
point of order, and seven amendments were withdrawn.  Of these 65
amendments, 26 amendments were offered, considered, and set aside
prior to the expiration of the 20-hour limit.  Subsequently, these 26
amendments were considered under the accelerated voting
procedures; eight amendments were adopted, 14 amendments fell on
a point of order, and four amendments were withdrawn.
The Senate’s “Byrd Rule” Against Extraneous Matter
During the first several years’ experience with reconciliation, the legislation
contained many provisions that were extraneous to the purpose of implementing
budget resolution policies.  The reconciliation submissions of committees included
such things as provisions that had no budgetary effect, that increased spending or
reduced revenues when the reconciliation instructions called for reduced spending
or increased revenues, or that violated another committee’s jurisdiction.
Reconciliation procedures, and other expedited procedures that limit debate and
restrict the offering of amendments, run counter to the long-standing practices of the
Senate applicable to most legislation, in which Senators may engage in extended
debate and freely offer amendments.  Many Senators were willing to surrender
customary freedoms with respect to debate and amendment in order to expedite
reconciliation legislation, but they sought a means of confining the scope of such
legislation to its budgetary purposes.
In 1985 and 1986, the Senate adopted the Byrd rule (named after its principal
sponsor, Senator Robert C. Byrd) on a temporary basis as a means of curbing these
practices.  The Byrd rule has been extended and modified several times over the
years.  In 1990, the Byrd rule was incorporated into the 1974 Congressional Budget
Act as Section 313 and made permanent.77
In general, a point of order authorized under the Byrd rule may be raised in order
to strike extraneous matter already in the bill as reported or discharged (or in the
conference report), or to prevent the incorporation of extraneous matter through the
adoption of amendments or motions.  A point of order may be raised against a single
provision or two or more provisions in the bill (usually as designated by title or
section number, or by page and line number), in amendments offered thereto, or in
motions made thereon, or against an entire amendment or amendments.  The chair
may sustain a point of order as to all of the provisions (or amendments) or only some
of them.  The maker of the point of order defines the scope of the provision or
provisions being challenged.
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The Byrd rule is nearly unique in that points of order made thereunder bring
down the offending matter, but not the entire measure.  Once material has been
stricken from reconciliation legislation under the Byrd rule, it may not be offered
again as an amendment.
A motion to waive the Byrd rule, or to sustain an appeal of the ruling of the
chair on a point of order raised under the Byrd rule, requires the affirmative vote of
three-fifths of the membership (60 Senators if no seats are vacant).78  A single waiver
motion can:  (1) apply to the Byrd rule as well as other provisions of the
Congressional Budget Act; (2) involve multiple as well as single provisions or
amendments; (3) extend (for specified language) through consideration of the
conference report as well as initial consideration of the measure or amendment; and
(4) be made prior to the raising of a point of order, thus making the point of order
moot.  While the point of order itself is not debatable, the motion to waive is
debatable, subject to the time limits for debatable motions.
When a reconciliation measure, or a conference report thereon, is considered,
the Senate Budget Committee must submit for the record a list of potentially
extraneous matter included therein.79  This list is advisory, however, and does not
bind the chair in ruling on points of order.
Determinations of budgetary levels for purposes of enforcing the Byrd rule are
made by the Senate Budget Committee.
Definitions of Extraneous Matter.  Subsection (b)(1) of the Byrd rule
provides definitions of what constitutes extraneous matter for purposes of the rule.
Some aspects of the Byrd rule require considerable judgment regarding its
application to complex legislation.  As the Senate Budget Committee noted in its
report on the budget resolution for fiscal year 1994, “‘Extraneous’ is a term of art.”80
In the most general terms, the rule bars the inclusion of matter that is not related to
the purposes of the reconciliation process.
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A provision is considered to be extraneous if it falls under one or more of the
following six definitions:
(1) it does not produce a change in outlays or revenues;
(2) it produces an outlay increase or revenue decrease when the
instructed committee is not in compliance with its instructions;
(3) it is outside of the jurisdiction of the committee that submitted the
title or provision for inclusion in the reconciliation measure;
(4) it produces a change in outlays or revenues which is merely incidental
to the non-budgetary components of the provision;
(5) it would increase the deficit for a fiscal year beyond those covered by
the reconciliation measure; and
(6) it recommends changes in Social Security.
The last definition complements the ban in Section 310(g) of the 1974 act
against considering any reconciliation legislation that contains recommendations
pertaining to Social Security.  While a successful point of order under the last
definition in the Byrd rule would excise the offending provision, a successful point
of order under Section 310(g) would defeat the entire bill.
Exceptions to the Definition of Extraneous Matter.  Subsection (b)(2)
of the Byrd rule provides that a Senate-originated provision that does not produce a
change in outlays or revenues shall not be considered extraneous if the chairman and
ranking minority members of the Budget Committee and the committee reporting the
provision certify that:
! the provision mitigates direct effects clearly attributable to a
provision changing outlays or revenues and both provisions together
produce a net reduction in the deficit; or
! the provision will (or is likely to) reduce outlays or increase
revenues:  (1) in one or more fiscal years beyond those covered by
the reconciliation measure; (2) on the basis of new regulations, court
rulings on pending legislation, or relationships between economic
indices and stipulated statutory triggers pertaining to the provision;
or (3) but reliable estimates cannot be made due to insufficient data.
Subsection (b)(3) of the Byrd rule provides an exception to the definition of
extraneousness on the basis of committee jurisdiction for certain provisions reported
by a committee, if they would be referred to that committee upon introduction as a
separate measure.
Additionally, under subsection (b)(1)(A), a provision that does not change
outlays or revenues in the net, but which includes outlay decreases or revenue
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increases that exactly offset outlay increases or revenue decreases, is not considered
to be extraneous.
The Byrd rule has been applied to 19 reconciliation measures considered by the
Senate from 1985 through 2004.  In 42 of the 55 actions involving the Byrd rule,
opponents were able to strike extraneous matter from legislation (18 cases) or bar the
consideration of extraneous amendments (24 cases) by raising points of order.  Nine
of 41 motions to waive the Byrd rule, in order to retain or add extraneous matter,
were successful.  The Byrd rule has been used only four times during consideration
of a conference report on a reconciliation measure (twice in 1993, once in 1995, and
once in 1997).
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Resolving House-Senate Differences on
Reconciliation Measures
Under the usual practice, the House and Senate initially consider and pass their
own reconciliation measures.  In addition, reconciliation measures are complex, and
in many instances, quite lengthy legislation.  Accordingly, these factors effectively
guarantee that the House and Senate bills will be different.  The two chambers must,
however, as with all legislation, agree to the same reconciliation measure in the exact
same form before it can be sent to the President.  For the most part, the House and
Senate employ the usual legislative procedures and practices under their rules to
resolve differences on reconciliation measures, although the Congressional Budget
Act of 1974 specifies some aspects of procedure at this stage.
As with other complex legislation, the House and Senate typically use a
conference as the means of developing an agreement on reconciliation legislation.
In the case of all but one of the 19 reconciliation measures ultimately submitted by
Congress to the President, the House and Senate convened a conference on the
measure and a conference report was issued.  In the one instance involving
reconciliation legislation, the two chambers passed identical legislation and there
were no differences to resolve.  (In response to reconciliation directives in the
FY1984 budget resolution, the Senate passed a House-passed reconciliation bill
without amendment, clearing it for the President.)
The pattern with regard to conference procedure on reconciliation measures has
been for the Senate to consider one or two Senate bills initially, then to take up and
amend the House — passed bill in order to proceed to conference.  Table 8 provides
information on House and Senate actions on conference reports on reconciliation
measures.  The one exception to the pattern occurred in 1982.  In response to
reconciliation directives in the FY1983 budget resolution, the Senate initially
considered, and went to conference with the House on, a House-numbered bill, H.R.
4961 (which became the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982).
The House and Senate also may use an amendment exchange instead of a
conference in order to resolve differences regarding legislation, or as a fallback
procedure when conference agreements are not completed successfully.  In the case
of reconciliation legislation, amendment exchanges are seldom used.  The conference
report on the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, for
example, was rejected by the House on December 19, 1985, by a vote of 205-151.81
Between December 19, 1985, and March 20, 1986, the House and Senate exchanged
amendments nine times before their disagreements were resolved.82  In addition, a
successful point of order raised under the Byrd rule against the conference report on
the Balanced Budget Act of 1995 resulted in the Senate receding and concurring with
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a further amendment that effectively deleted the offending matter.  Although the
House had previously adopted the conference report, it resolved the disagreement by
concurring in the further Senate amendment.
Initial Motions and Appointment of Conferees
In order to proceed to conference, the second chamber to act states its
disagreement with the recommendations of the first chamber and insists on its
disagreement.  Then, the second chamber requests a conference with the first
chamber in order to resolve the disagreements.  In the case of reconciliation
legislation, the Senate has always been the “second” chamber to act, with respect to
setting up a conference.
After a conference has been requested and agreed to, each chamber appoints
conferees.  Upon the appointment of conferees by both chambers, the conference
committee may then convene to carry out its work.  In the Senate, these steps usually
are merged together into a single unanimous consent request; in the House, conferees
are not necessarily appointed at the time that the other actions occur.83
In instances where there is unusual controversy or complications in entering into
a conference, each of the three required steps may entail a separate motion (and vote).
The House, in a few cases, used special rules reported by the House Rules Committee
to go to conference. 
In the House, it is the prerogative of the Speaker to appoint conferees, while in
the Senate, the usual practice is for the full Senate by unanimous consent to authorize
the Presiding Office to appoint them.
Conferees can be appointed to consider the entire matter in conference or only
for limited-purposes.  “General conferees” negotiate over the entire bill and any
amendments, and “limited-purpose” conferees negotiate only on a portion of the
matter in conference designated at the time of appointment.
Both types of conferees are appointed on omnibus reconciliation measures.
Members of the House and Senate Budget Committee are appointed as general
conferees (and the chairman and ranking member serve as floor managers of the
conference report).  Members of the committees that submitted reconciliation
directives make up the rest of the conference committee.  The conferees from the
legislative committees have the responsibility of resolving differences in the
legislative language within their committee’s jurisdiction, while the conferees from
the Budget Committees work to facilitate the conference actions generally and
promote a timely resolution of policy disagreements.  From time to time, when a
Member must drop out of conference proceedings, a replacement may be appointed.
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When a conference committee deals with a reconciliation measure that was
reported to each chamber by a single committee, the conferees usually are chosen
from the legislative committee’s membership.
Sometimes matter within the jurisdiction of a committee in one chamber that did
not receive a reconciliation instruction may be before the conferees because of the
action of the other body.  Therefore, a chamber may include conferees from more
committees than were instructed in the budget resolution.
Conferences on reconciliation measures sometimes involve only a few Members
from each chamber.  The House and Senate appointed three conferees each, for
example, on the Marriage Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2000.  In many
instances, however, the wide range of issues encompassed by reconciliation, and the
large number of conferees appointed to address them, leads to the creation of
subconferences.  The largest conference on a reconciliation measure, the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982, involved 184 Representatives and 69 Senators
and relied upon 58 subconferences.
The subconferences are established informally by agreement of the conference
leaders.  Members of the legislative committees involved in the conference typically
are assigned only to the subconferences that deal with matters within their
committee’s jurisdiction.  The general conferees from the Budget Committees also
are assigned to subconferences, but they do not directly negotiate the resolution of
the pending legislative issues.  These procedures are informal in the Senate, for under
the Senate rules, a Senate conferee is a conferee for all purposes, and a majority of
all Senate conferees must sign the conference report to conclude the conference,
regardless of the purposes for which the Senate appointed the conferees.
Motions to Instruct Conferees
When the House and Senate prepare to go to conference on a measure, it is not
uncommon in either chamber for one or more motions to be considered that instruct
conferees.  Instructions to conferees may encourage them to take a particular position
on an issue, or set of issues, but neither chamber regards the instructions as binding
the conferees in any way.
In the House, the motion to instruct can be offered at three separate times in the
legislative process:  (1) prior to the appointment of conferees; (2) after the conferees
have been appointed for 20 calendar days and 10 legislative days, but before they
report to the House; (3) and after the conferees have reported, in conjunction with a
motion to recommit the conference report.   Only one motion to instruct conferees is
allowed prior to the appointment of conferees, and only one in a motion to recommit
a conference report; in contrast, the practice of the House is to admit multiple 20-day
motions to instruct.  Members of the minority party are accorded preference in
recognition to offer motions to instruct in the first two instances, but are not accorded
preference in recognition to offer the 20-day motion.
Motions to instruct conferees are not as common in the Senate as in the House,
in part because Senators generally have more opportunity than Representatives to be
heard on measures and to let their views on conference negotiations be known.  In
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the Senate, motions to instruct can only be offered prior to the appointment of
conferees, but Senators also instruct their conferees through simple resolutions and
amendments to legislation.  
Motions to instruct conferees have been made to reconciliation measures, just
as they have been made to budget resolutions.  In the case of budget resolutions,
motions to instruct conferees have been made regularly in the House but infrequently
in the Senate.84  With respect to reconciliation measures, however, such motions have
been made regularly in the House and on occasion in the Senate.  Some examples of
the circumstances under which motions to instruct conferees were made in each
chamber are discussed below:
! Motions to Instruct in the House.  In the House, the first motion
to instruct conferees on a reconciliation measure occurred the first
year that reconciliation was used.  On September 18, 1980, the
House agreed to such a motion with respect to the conference on
H.R. 7765 by a vote of 300-73.  In 1997, motions to instruct
conferees were made in the case of both reconciliation bills that year.
A motion offered by Representative John Spratt, ranking member of
the Budget Committee, on July 10, 1997, to the Balanced Budget
Act of 1997 (H.R. 2015) was approved by a vote of 414-14, but a
motion offered the same day by Representative Charles Rangel,
ranking member of the Ways and Means Committee, to the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, was rejected by a vote of 199-233.
! Motions to Instruct in the Senate.  The Senate considered a single
motion to instruct conferees in 1981 and 1989.  The first such
motion insisted that funding for the Head Start Program be set at
specified levels for FY1982-FY1984, while the second instructed the
Senate conferees not to accept any House language that would not
result in savings or in revenue increases.  During consideration of
the Balanced Budget Act of 1995, the Senate on November 13,
1995, considered four different motions to instruct conferees,
adopting three of them and tabling the other.
Motions to instruct conferees may be amended.  On July 14, 1993, for example,
a motion to instruct conferees on the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
(H.R. 2264) was amended by an amendment in the nature of a substitute, by a vote
of 235-183; the motion to instruct, as amended, was agreed to by a vote of 415-0.
Conducting the Conference and Reporting the Conference
Agreement
Procedures relating to the conduct of conferences between the House and Senate
on legislation are relatively informal, and conferees are granted considerable latitude
in resolving the chambers’ differences.  The chairmanship of the conference
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committee is determined by the conferees, who usually select the chairman of the
Budget Committee, in the case of omnibus reconciliation bills, or the chairman of the
House Ways and Means Committee or the Senate Finance Committee, when those
committees were instructed to report separate reconciliation legislation.  By tradition,
the chairmanship of the conference alternates between the House and Senate.
When the conferees reach agreement with respect to their disagreements on a
reconciliation measure, they submit a conference report explaining the agreement.
The report consists of two separate items:  (1) the conference report, which explains
the actions proposed by the conferees to resolve the disagreements between the two
bodies, including the recommended legislative text; and (2) the accompanying “joint
explanatory statement,” also referred to as the “managers’ statement,” which explains
the actions of the conferees with regard to the particular policy issues that they
addressed, often in great detail.
The conference report reflects the agreement of a majority of the conferees of
the House and a majority of the conferees from the Senate.  Each of the conferees
that supports the conference report signs a signature sheet for both the conference
report and the joint explanatory statement.  Any conferee who does not support the
agreement is not required to sign the signature sheets, and usually does not do so.  
Limited-purpose conferees only sign for the portion of the agreement they were
given authority to negotiate.  For a conference report to be valid in the House, a
majority of the Members from each chamber who were appointed to negotiate each
provision must sign the report.  For a conference report to be valid in the Senate, a
majority of all House conferees and a majority of all Senate conferees must sign the
report, regardless of whether or not any of the conferees were appointed for limited
purposes.
The conference report and joint explanatory statement are published as a House
report and printed in the Congressional Record.  (Although a conference report may
be published as a Senate report too, the Senate usually defers such action.)
Consideration of the Conference Report
Conference reports are privileged matters in both the House and Senate and may
be called up for consideration as a priority matter.  Motions to proceed to the
consideration of a conference report are not debatable.  In the House, conference
reports typically are considered for one hour, but in the Senate conference reports
may be debated for up to10 hours.
The House usually considers conference reports on major legislation under the
terms of a special rule.  In recent years, the special rule has provided a “blanket”
waiver of all points of order against the conference report and, in some instances,
more than the typical hour of debate time.  In 1997, for example, special rules
extended the debate time on the conference report on the Balanced Budget Act of
1997 to 90 minutes, under H.Res. 202, and extended the debate time on the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997 to two and one-half hours, under H.Res. 206.
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In the Senate, the consideration of a conference report on a reconciliation
measure may differ markedly from the consideration of conference reports on other
types of measures in one key respect.  The Byrd rule, which applies only to
reconciliation measures, allows for extraneous matter to be stricken from a
conference report pursuant to the successful raising of a point of order.  Typically,
when a point of order is successfully raised against a conference report in the Senate,
the conference report is defeated.  Pursuant to the Byrd rule, however, the Senate may
remove language from the conference report without causing the remainder of the
conference report to be rejected.  In that case, under the Byrd rule, the Senate recedes
and concurs with a further amendment that effectively deletes the offending matter.
The House and Senate may reach final agreement on the measure by resolving their
disagreement on the further Senate amendment, as occurred in connection with the
Balanced Budget Act of 1995.
The Senate sometimes will use unanimous consent agreements to customize
procedures during the consideration of a conference report, and agreements reached
during initial consideration of a reconciliation measure often are made applicable to
the consideration of the conference report as well.  In July of 1997, for example, the
Senate considered two reconciliation measures under a unanimous consent agreement
that had been entered into on May 21 of that year, at the time the FY1998 budget
resolution was under consideration.85  The agreement suspended the application of
one component of the Byrd rule under certain circumstances, during both initial
action on the reconciliation measures and during consideration of the conference
reports, effectively allowing long-term tax cuts in one act to be offset by long-term
spending reductions in the other.
One chamber may recommit the conference report to the existing conference
committee if the other chamber has not yet acted on the report.  This situation
occurred in 1982, during House consideration of the conference report (H.Rept. 97-
750) on the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982.  On August 17, 1982, the
House recommitted the report to the conference by a vote of 266-145.  Subsequently,
the conference committee reported a second agreement (H.Rept. 97-759), which both
chambers accepted.
Once a chamber acts on the conference report, the conference committee
formally is dissolved and cannot resume consideration of the measure.  If either
chamber disagrees to a conference report, “the matter is left in the position it was in
before the conference was asked but in the stage of disagreement.”86  At this point,
the chambers may dispose of the matter in disagreement by motion, or send it to a
further conference.  In the case of reconciliation legislation, a further conference
never has been convened.
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Enrollment and Technical Corrections
The House and Senate often consider measures pertaining to the enrollment of
complex and lengthy legislation, either to expedite the enrollment or to make
technical corrections.
Title 1, Section 107 of the United States Code, requires that measures be
enrolled on parchment paper.  In order to expedite the enrollment of the measure,
thereby speeding up its presentation to the President, the requirement in 1 U.S.C. 107
sometimes is waived (upon certification by the House Administration Committee that
a “true” or accurate enrollment is prepared) by the enactment of a joint resolution.
On July 31, 1997, for example, the House and Senate agreed to H.J.Res. 90, which
waived the enrollment requirements with respect to the two reconciliation measures,
H.R. 2014 and H.R. 2015.  The measure became P.L. 105-32 (111 Stat. 250) on
August 1, 1997.
Second, the House and Senate may make technical corrections in a measure
prior to enrollment by adopting a concurrent resolution directing the Clerk of the
House or the Secretary of the Senate, as appropriate, to make the necessary changes.
Enrollment correction measures may originate in either the House or Senate and often
have been used in connection with the reconciliation process.  Technical corrections
were made, for example, in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 pursuant
to H.Con.Res. 167, and such corrections were made in the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1983 pursuant to S.Con.Res. 102.
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Presidential Approval or Disapproval
Reconciliation measures follow the same legislative path to enactment as other
legislation.  After a bill is submitted to him, the President has 10 days (excluding
Sundays) in which to approve or disapprove it.  If the President signs or does not sign
the bill during the 10-day period, it becomes law; however, if Congress adjourns sine
die during the 10-day period, thereby preventing the bill’s return, it is disapproved
by “pocket veto.”  If the President vetoes the bill during the 10-day period, it is
returned to the chamber in which it originated (as a “return veto”), along with a
message explaining the President’s objections.  The House and Senate then have an
opportunity to override the President’s veto, thus enacting the measure into law.
In 1996, the Line Item Veto Act conferred line-item veto authority on the
President, which President Clinton used in 1997 in connection with two
reconciliation measures and several annual appropriations acts; the act was nullified
by the Supreme Court in 1998.
Presidential Approval
Congress has sent the President 19 reconciliation acts, of which 16 have been
signed by the President into law.  None of these measures became law without the
President signing them.  Eleven reconciliation acts were signed into law by
Republican Presidents — Ronald Reagan (7), George H.W. Bush (2), and George W.
Bush (2); five reconciliation acts were signed into law by Democratic Presidents —
Jimmy Carter (1) and Bill Clinton (4).
While congressional deliberations on reconciliation legislation are underway,
the President may signal his approval of congressional action through various means.
In the case of major budgetary legislation, these signals are conveyed principally
through the issuance of Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs), which the
Office of Management and Budget maintains for the current administration on its
Web site ([http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/]).  SAPs take on more significance if
congressional action is at significant variance with the President’s recommendations.
In such instances, his advisers may use SAPs to raise the possibility or likelihood of
a presidential veto if policy adjustments acceptable to the Administration are not
made in the legislation (see discussion below).
In view of the significance usually attached to reconciliation legislation, the
President often signs such legislation into law in an official signing ceremony
attended by Members of Congress, cabinet members, and other executive officials
involved in the process that culminated in the enactment of the legislation.  Any
official statement issued by the President upon the signing of the measure, as well as
any remarks made during the event, are included in the Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents, which is maintained by the National Archives and Records
Administration and is available at the GPO Access Web site
[http://www.gpoaccess.gov].
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Presidential Veto
Three of the reconciliation acts sent to the President by Congress were vetoed,
all by President Bill Clinton.87  In each instance, Republican majorities in Congress
fashioned reconciliation measures proposing significant policy changes that were
fundamentally at odds with President Clinton’s policy agenda.
When an Administration is engaged with Congress in the formulation of
budgetary legislation, the SAPs may be used to motivate Congress to adopt policies
favored by the Administration and to drop policies that it does not favor.  The
language of the SAPs may be modulated to present the mix of encouragement and
veto threat considered appropriate.  With respect to a particular issue encompassed
by the legislation, for example, the SAP might express the “concern” of senior
Administration officials and indicate the possibility that they might recommend to
the President that he veto the bill if the offending provisions are retained or not
appropriately modified.
In the case of the three reconciliation acts that President Clinton vetoed, the
SAPs clearly communicated his opposition.  The SAP issued on July 27, 1999,
pertaining to Senate action on the Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999, for
example, stated:  “The Administration strongly opposes the package of tax cut
proposals contained in S. 1429.  If a bill encompassing these proposals were to pass
the Congress, the President would veto it.”  The bluntness of the wording left
Congress no doubt regarding how the President would react to such a bill, if it were
presented to him.
When the President vetoes a bill, he returns it to the House of its origin with a
message notifying the chamber of his action and explaining the basis of his
objections.  The veto message, together with the vetoed bill, is printed as a House
document.  President Clinton’s message to the House regarding his veto of the
Balanced Budget Act of 1995 began:
I am returning herewith without my approval H.R. 2491, the budget
reconciliation bill adopted by the Republican majority, which seeks
to make extreme cuts and other unacceptable changes in Medicare
and Medicaid, and to raise taxes on millions of working Americans.88
The veto message continued with a title-by-title summary of the major
programmatic objections to the legislation.  In addition, a nine-page enumeration of
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82 specific objections, arranged by program area (e.g., Medicare, Medicaid, student
loans, food stamps, and special interest tax provisions), was attached.89
Upon the return of a vetoed bill to the Senate (or the House), the veto message
is read and the measure either is reconsidered, referred to committee, or tabled.  If the
chamber to which the vetoed bill was returned passes it by a two-thirds vote, it is
then sent to the other chamber.  If the second chamber also passes it by a two-thirds
vote, then it becomes law over the President’s objections.
All of the reconciliation bills sent to the President carried a House number.
Consequently, the three vetoed bills were returned to the House.  The vetoed bills
were referred to the committee that reported them, either the House Budget
Committee or the House Ways and Means Committee.  Subsequent motions to
discharge the bill from committee were made with respect to the two bills referred
to the Ways and Means Committee.  One discharge motion was tabled by a vote of
215-203, but the other discharge motion was successful.  In that instance, the House
reconsidered the vetoed bill (the Marriage Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2000),
but the bill failed on a vote of 270-158, by not securing the necessary two-thirds
margin.  These actions are discussed in more detail below:
! the Balanced Budget Act of 1995 (H.R. 2491) was vetoed on
December 6, 1995, and returned to the House.  Later that day, the
chair laid the veto message (H.Doc. 104-141) before the House,
which referred the message and the bill to the Budget Committee by
unanimous consent.
! the Taxpayer Refund and Relief Act of 1999 (H.R. 2488) was vetoed
on September 23, 1999, and returned to the House.  Later that day,
the chair laid the veto message (H.Doc. 106-130) before the House,
which referred the message and the bill to the Ways and Means
Committee by voice vote.  On October 19, a motion to discharge the
bill from committee was tabled by a vote of 215-203.
! the Marriage Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2000 (H.R. 4810) was
vetoed on August 5, 2000, and returned to the House.  The chair laid
the veto message (H.Doc. 106-291) before the House on September
6 and, later that day, the House referred the message and the bill to
the Ways and Means Committee by unanimous consent.  On
September 13, the House discharged the bill from committee and
reconsidered it.  Upon reconsideration, the bill failed by a vote of
270-158, lacking the necessary two-thirds.  
Because the House did not successfully reconsider any of the three vetoed
reconciliation bills, they were not sent to the Senate.
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Line-Item Veto
The Line Item Veto Act was enacted into law on April 9, 1996 (P.L. 104-130;
110 Stat. 1200-1212) and became effective on January 1, 1997.  The main procedures
under the act were incorporated into the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974, as amended, as a new Part C of Title X (Sections 1021-1027).
Reconciliation measures were included in the several types of budgetary legislation
subject to line item veto authority.
In 1998, the Line Item Veto Act was nullified by the Supreme Court in Clinton
v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).90  The case involved actions taken by
President Bill Clinton pertaining to reconciliation legislation enacted in 1997.  The
reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s decision is characterized as follows:
The Court rejected the argument that the President’s power to cancel items was
a mere exercise of discretionary authority granted by Congress. Instead, the
cancellation authority represented the repeal of law that could be accomplished
only through the regular legislative process, including bicameralism and
presentment. In the two cancellations that reached the Court, Congress did not
pass a resolution of disapproval. As a result, the Court concluded that “the
President has amended two Acts of Congress by repealing a portion of each.”91
The act authorized the President to cancel any dollar amount of discretionary
budget authority, any item of new direct spending, or any limited tax benefit in an act
if such cancellation will reduce the deficit, not impair any essential government
functions, and not harm the national interest.  The President could exercise this
authority only within five days of signing an act into law.  If he chose to line-item
veto any provisions in an act, he was required to notify Congress in a special
message.  Each cancellation had to be separately identified by its own reference
number.  Congress could consider, under expedited procedures set forth in the act,
special legislation to disapprove any cancellations.
At the end of July 1997, the House and Senate completed action on two
reconciliation measures implementing the tax cuts and most of the deficit reduction
called for in the FY1998 budget resolution (H.Con.Res. 84).  The first reconciliation
act, the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (H.R. 2015), made net reductions in direct
spending of $122 billion over the five fiscal years and increased the statutory limit
on the public debt to $5.950 trillion.  The second reconciliation act, the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997 (H.R. 2014), contained tax cuts which partially are offset by
revenue increases.  The net effect of revenue changes in the Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997, coupled with several revenue provisions in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997
(most notably, an increase in the tobacco tax), was a revenue reduction of $95 billion.
President Clinton signed the two measures into law on Tuesday, August 5 — the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 as P.L. 105-33 (111 Stat. 251), and the Taxpayer Relief
Act of 1997 as P.L. 105-34 (111 Stat. 788).
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On Monday, August 11, President Clinton exercised his authority under the Line
Item Veto Act to cancel one item of direct spending in the Balanced Budget Act of
1997 and two limited tax benefits in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.  These actions
represented the first use of the line-item veto authority.
Cancellation of Limited Tax Benefits.  Section 1027 of the Line Item Veto
Act required the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) to prepare a statement for any
revenue or reconciliation measure (amending the Internal Revenue Code of 1986) for
which a conference report was being prepared, identifying whether such legislation
contained any limited tax benefits.  The conferees, at their discretion, could include
the JCT information in a separate section of the measure, using a form prescribed by
the Line Item Veto Act.  If such a section was included, then the President could use
the item-veto authority only against the limited tax benefits identified in the section;
otherwise, the President could use the authority against any provision in the measure
that he felt met the definition of limited tax benefit provided in the act.
A total of 80 limited tax benefits were identified in the two reconciliation bills
sent to the President.  The conference report on the Balanced Budget Act of 1997
(H.Rept. 105-217) was filed on July 29.  Section 9304 of the act identified one
section as providing a limited tax benefit subject to the line-item veto (see the
Congressional Record of July 29, 1997, vol. 143, no. 109, part II, at page H6140).
That section, Section 5406, pertained to the tax treatment of certain services
performed by prison inmates.
The conference report on the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (H.Rept. 105-220)
was filed on July 30.  Section 1701 set forth a list prepared by the JCT of 79 limited
tax benefits subject to the line-item veto (see the Congressional Record of July 30,
1997, vol. 143, no. 110, part II, at pages H6490-91 and H6607-08). 
President Clinton applied the line-item veto to two limited tax benefits in the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.  The first, identified in his special message as
Cancellation No. 97-1, canceled Section 1175 (Exemption for Active Financing
Income) of the act.  Cancellation No. 97-2 applied to Section 968 (Nonrecognition
of Gain on Sale of Stock to Certain Farmers’ Cooperatives) of the act.  These
provisions were identified in Section 1701 of the act as items 54 and 30, respectively,
and dealt with the sheltering of income in foreign tax havens by financial services
companies and the treatment of capital gains on the sale of certain agricultural assets.
Cancellation of Direct Spending Item.  Unlike limited tax benefits, there
was no special procedure for congressional identification of items of new direct
spending.  The cost estimate prepared by the Congressional Budget Office on the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 identified about a dozen accounts that had increases
in direct spending for one or more fiscal years.  Presumably, at least a dozen (if not
dozens) of “items” of new direct spending were associated with these accounts.
President Clinton applied the line-item veto to one item of new direct spending
in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.  Cancellation No. 97-3 applied to subsection
4722(c) (Waiver of Certain Provider Tax Provisions) of Section 4722 (Treatment of




Appendix A. Text of Section 310 (Reconciliation)
(Section 310 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974; 2 U.S.C. 641)
Reconciliation
Sec. 310. (a) Inclusion of Reconciliation Directives in Concurrent
Resolutions on the Budget. — A concurrent resolution on the budget for any fiscal
year, to the extent necessary to effectuate the provisions and requirements of such
resolution, shall — 
(1) specify the total amount by which — 
(A) new budget authority for such fiscal year;
(B) budget authority initially provided for prior fiscal years;
(C) new entitlement authority which is to become effective during
such fiscal year; and
(D) credit authority for such fiscal year, contained in laws, bills, and
resolutions within the jurisdiction of a committee, is to be changed and
direct that committee to determine and recommend changes to accomplish
a change of such total amount;
(2) specify the total amount by which revenues are to be changed and direct
that the committees having jurisdiction to determine and recommend changes
in the revenue laws, bills, and resolutions to accomplish a change of such total
amount;
(3) specify the amounts by which the statutory limit on the public debt is
to be changed and direct the committee having jurisdiction to recommend such
change; or
(4) specify and direct any combination of the matters described in
paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) (including a direction to achieve deficit reduction).
(b) Legislative Procedure. — If a concurrent resolution containing directives
to one or more committees to determine and recommend changes in laws, bills, or
resolutions is agreed to in accordance with subsection (a) of this section, and — 
(1) only one committee of the House or the Senate is directed to determine
and recommend changes, that committee shall promptly make such
determination and recommendations and report to its House reconciliation
legislation containing such recommendations; or
(2) more than one committee of the House or the Senate is directed to
determine and recommend changes, each such committee so directed shall
promptly make such determination and recommendations and submit such
recommendations to the Committee on the Budget of its House, which, upon
receiving all such recommendations, shall report to its House reconciliation
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legislation carrying out all such recommendations without any substantive
revision.
For purposes of this subsection, a reconciliation resolution is a concurrent resolution
directing the Clerk of the House of Representatives or the Secretary of the Senate, as
the case may be, to make specified changes in bills and resolutions which have not
been enrolled.
(c) Compliance With Reconciliation Directions. — 
(1) Any committee of the House of Representatives or the Senate that is
directed, pursuant to a concurrent resolution on the budget, to determine and
recommend changes of the type described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of
subsection (a) of this section with respect to laws within its jurisdiction, shall
be deemed to have complied with such directions — 
(A) if — 
(i) the amount of the changes of the type described in paragraph
(1) of such subsection recommended by such committee do not
exceed or fall below the amount of the changes such committee was
directed by such concurrent resolution to recommend under such
paragraph by more than — 
(I) in the Senate, 20 percent of the total of the amounts of
the changes such committee was directed to make under
paragraphs (1) and (2) of such subsection; or
(II) in the House of Representatives, 20 percent of the sum
of the absolute value of the changes the committee was directed
to make under paragraph (1) and the absolute value of the
changes the committee was directed to make under paragraph
(2); and
(ii) the amount of the changes of the type described in paragraph
(2) of such subsection recommended by such committee do not
exceed or fall below the amount of the changes such committee was
directed by such concurrent resolution to recommend under that
paragraph by more than — 
(I) in the Senate, 20 percent of the total of the amounts of
the changes such committee was directed to make under
paragraphs (1) and (2) of such subsection; or
(II) in the House of Representatives, 20 percent of the sum
of the absolute value of the changes the committee was directed
to make under paragraph (1) and the absolute value of the
changes the committee was directed to make under paragraph
(2); and
(B) if the total amount of the changes recommended by such
committee is not less than the total of the amounts of the changes such
committee was directed to make under paragraphs (1) and (2) of such
subsection.
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(2)(A) Upon the reporting to the Committee on the Budget of the Senate
of a recommendation that shall be deemed to have complied with such
directions solely by virtue of this subsection, the chairman of that committee
may file with the Senate appropriately revised allocations under section 633(a)
of this title and revised functional levels and aggregates to carry out this
subsection.
(B) Upon the submission to the Senate of a conference report
recommending a reconciliation bill or resolution in which a committee
shall be deemed to have complied with such directions solely by virtue of
this subsection, the chairman of the Committee on the Budget of the
Senate may file with the Senate appropriately revised allocations under
section 633(a) of this title and revised functional levels and aggregates to
carry out this subsection.
(C) Allocations, functional levels, and aggregates revised pursuant to
this paragraph shall be considered to be allocations, functional levels, and
aggregates contained in the concurrent resolution on the budget pursuant
to section 632 of this title.
(D) Upon the filing of revised allocations pursuant to this paragraph,
the reporting committee shall report revised allocations pursuant to section
633(b) of this title to carry out this subsection.
(d) Limitation on Amendments to Reconciliation Bills and Resolutions. —
(1) It shall not be in order in the House of Representatives to consider any
amendment to a reconciliation bill or reconciliation resolution if such
amendment would have the effect of increasing any specific budget outlays
above the level of such outlays provided in the bill or resolution (for the fiscal
years covered by the reconciliation instructions set forth in the most recently
agreed to concurrent resolution on the budget), or would have the effect of
reducing any specific Federal revenues below the level of such revenues
provided in the bill or resolution (for such fiscal years), unless such amendment
makes at least an equivalent reduction in other specific budget outlays, an
equivalent increase in other specific Federal revenues, or an equivalent
combination thereof (for such fiscal years), except that a motion to strike a
provision providing new budget authority or new entitlement authority may be
in order.
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(2) It shall not be in order in the Senate to consider any amendment to a
reconciliation bill or reconciliation resolution if such amendment would have
the effect of decreasing any specific budget outlay reductions below the level
of such outlay reductions provided (for the fiscal years covered) in the
reconciliation instructions which relate to such bill or resolution set forth in a
resolution providing for reconciliation, or would have the effect of reducing
Federal revenue increases below the level of such revenue increases provided
(for such fiscal years) in such instructions relating to such bill or resolution,
unless such amendment makes a reduction in other specific budget outlays, an
increase in other specific Federal revenues, or a combination thereof (for such
fiscal years) at least equivalent to any increase in outlays or decrease in revenues
provided by such amendment, except that a motion to strike a provision shall
always be in order.
(3) Paragraphs (1) and (2) shall not apply if a declaration of war by the
Congress is in effect.
(4) For purposes of this section, the levels of budget outlays and Federal
revenues for a fiscal year shall be determined on the basis of estimates made by
the Committee on the Budget of the House of Representatives or of the Senate,
as the case may be.
(5) The Committee on Rules of the House of Representatives may make
in order amendments to achieve changes specified by reconciliation directives
contained in a concurrent resolution on the budget if a committee or committees
of the House fail to submit recommended changes to its Committee on the
Budget pursuant to its instruction.
(e) Procedure in Senate. — 
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the provisions of section 636 of
this title for the consideration in the Senate of concurrent resolutions on the
budget and conference reports thereon shall also apply to the consideration in
the Senate of reconciliation bills reported under subsection (b) of this section
and conference reports thereon.
(2) Debate in the Senate on any reconciliation bill reported under
subsection (b) of this section, and all amendments thereto and debatable
motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than
20 hours.
(f) Completion of Reconciliation Process. — It shall not be in order in the
House of Representatives to consider any resolution providing for an adjournment
period of more than three calendar days during the month of July until the House of
Representatives has completed action on the reconciliation legislation for the fiscal
year beginning on October 1 of the calendar year to which the adjournment resolution
pertains, if reconciliation legislation is required to be reported by the concurrent
resolution on the budget for such fiscal year.
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(g) Limitation on Changes to Social Security Act. — Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, it shall not be in order in the Senate or the House of
Representatives to consider any reconciliation bill or reconciliation resolution
reported pursuant to a concurrent resolution on the budget agreed to under section
632 or 635 of this title, or a joint resolution pursuant to section 907d of this title, or
any amendment thereto or conference report thereon, that contains recommendations
with respect to the old-age, survivors, and disability insurance program established
under title II of the Social Security Act.
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Appendix B.  Text of Section 313 (the “Byrd Rule”)
(Section 313 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974; 2. U.S.C. 644)
Extraneous Matter in Reconciliation Legislation
Sec. 313.  (a)  In General. — When the Senate is considering a reconciliation
bill or a reconciliation resolution pursuant to Section 310, (whether that bill or
resolution originated in the Senate or the House) or Section 258C of the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 upon a point of order being made
by any Senator against material extraneous to the instructions to a committee which
is contained in any title or provision of the bill or resolution or offered as an
amendment to the bill or resolution, and the point of order is sustained by the Chair,
any part of said title or provision that contains material extraneous to the instructions
to said Committee as defined in subsection (b) shall be deemed stricken from the bill
and may not be offered as an amendment from the floor.
(b)  Extraneous Provisions. — 
(1)(A)  Except as provided in paragraph (2), a provision of a reconciliation
bill or reconciliation resolution considered pursuant to Section 310 shall be
considered extraneous if such provision does not produce a change in outlays
or revenues, including changes in outlays and revenues brought about by
changes in the terms and conditions under which outlays are made or revenues
are required to be collected (but a provision in which outlay decreases or
revenue increases exactly offset outlay increases or revenue decreases shall not
be considered extraneous by virtue of this subparagraph);
(B)  any provision producing an increase in outlays or decrease in
revenues shall be considered extraneous if the net effect of provisions
reported by the Committee reporting the title containing the provision is
that the Committee fails to achieve its reconciliation instructions;
(C)  a provision that is not in the jurisdiction of the Committee with
jurisdiction over said title or provision shall be considered extraneous;
(D)  a provision shall be considered extraneous if it produces changes
in outlays or revenues which are merely incidental to the non-budgetary
components of the provision;
(E)  a provision shall be considered to be extraneous if it increases,
or would increase, net outlays, or if it decreases, or would decrease,
revenues during a fiscal year after the fiscal years covered by such
reconciliation bill or reconciliation resolution, and such increases or
decreases are greater than outlay reductions or revenue increases resulting
from other provisions in such title in such year; and
(F)  a provision shall be considered extraneous if it violates Section
310(g).
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(2)  A Senate-originated provision shall not be considered extraneous
under paragraph (1)(A) if the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the
Committee on the Budget and the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of
the Committee which reported the provision certify that:
(A)  the provision mitigates direct effects clearly attributable to a
provision changing outlays or revenues and both provisions together
produce a net reduction in the deficit;
(B)  the provision will result in a substantial reduction in outlays or
a substantial increase in revenues during fiscal years after the fiscal years
covered by the reconciliation bill or reconciliation resolution;
(C)  a reduction of outlays or an increase in revenues is likely to occur
as a result of the provision, in the event of new regulations authorized by
the provision or likely to be proposed, court rulings on pending litigation,
or relationships between economic indices and stipulated statutory triggers
pertaining to the provision, other than the regulations, court rulings or
relationships currently projected by the Congressional Budget Office for
scorekeeping purposes; or
(D)  such provisions will be likely to produce a significant reduction
in outlays or increases in revenues but, due to insufficient data, such
reduction or increase cannot be reliably estimated.
(3)  A provision reported by a committee shall not be considered
extraneous under paragraph (1)(C) if
(A)  the provision is an integral part of a provision or title, which if
introduced as a bill or resolution would be referred to such committee, and
the provision sets forth the procedure to carry out or implement the
substantive provisions that were reported and which fall within the
jurisdiction of such committee; or
(B)  the provision states an exception to, or a special application of,
the general provision or title of which it is a part and such general
provision or title if introduced as a bill or resolution would be referred to
such committee.
(c)  Extraneous Materials. — Upon the reporting or discharge of a
reconciliation bill or resolution pursuant to Section 310 in the Senate, and again upon
the submission of a conference report on such reconciliation bill or resolution, the
Committee on the Budget of the Senate shall submit for the record a list of material
considered to be extraneous under subsections (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), and (b)(1)(E) of
this section to the instructions of a committee as provided in this section.  The
inclusion or exclusion of a provision shall not constitute a determination of
extraneousness by the Presiding Officer of the Senate.
CRS-107
(d)  Conference Reports. — When the Senate is considering a conference
report on, or an amendment between the Houses in relation to, a reconciliation bill
or reconciliation resolution pursuant to Section 310, upon — 
(1)  a point of order being made by an Senator against extraneous material
meeting the definition of subsections (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E),
or (b)(1)(F), and
(2)  such point of order being sustained, such material contained in such
conference report or amendment shall be deemed stricken, and the Senate shall
proceed, without intervening action or motion, to consider the question of
whether the Senate shall recede from its amendment and concur with a further
amendment, or concur in the House amendment with a further amendment, as
the case may be, which further amendment shall consist of only that portion of
the conference report or House amendment, as the case may be, not so stricken.
Any such motion in the Senate shall be debatable for 2 hours.  In any case in
which such point of order is sustained against a conference report (or Senate
amendment derived from such conference report by operation of this
subsection), no further amendment shall be in order.
(e)  General Point of Order. — Notwithstanding any other law or rule of the
Senate, it shall be in order for a Senator to raise a single point of order that several
provisions of a bill, resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report violate this
section.  The Presiding Officer may sustain the point of order as to some or all of the
provisions against which the Senator raised the point of order.  If the Presiding
Officer so sustains the point of order as to some of the provisions (including
provisions of an amendment, motion, or conference report) against which the Senator
raised the point of order, then only those provisions (including provisions of an
amendment, motion, or conference report) against which the Presiding Officer
sustains the point or order shall be deemed stricken pursuant to this section.  Before
the Presiding Officer rules on such a point of order, any Senator may move to waive
such a point of order as it applies to some or all of the provisions against which the
point of order was raised.  Such a motion to waive is amendable in accordance with
the rules and precedents of the Senate.  After the Presiding Officer rules on such a
point of order, any Senator may appeal the ruling of the Presiding Officer on such a
point of order as it applies to some or all of the provisions on which the Presiding
Officer ruled.
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Appendix C.  Other Congressional Research Service
Products on the Budget Reconciliation Process
CRS Report 98-814, Budget Reconciliation Legislation: Development and
Consideration, by Bill Heniff Jr.
CRS Report RL30458, The Budget Reconciliation Process:  Timing of Legislative
Action,  by Robert Keith.
CRS Report RL30862, The Budget Reconciliation Process: The Senate’s “Byrd
Rule,” by Robert Keith.
CRS Report RL30714, Congressional Action on Revenue and Debt Reconciliation
Measures in 2000,  by Robert Keith.
CRS Report RL31902, Revenue Reconciliation Directives in the FY2004 Budget
Resolution,  by Robert Keith.
CRS Report RS20870, Revenue Reconciliation Directives to the Senate Finance
Committee in Congressional Budget Resolutions, by Robert Keith.
CRS Report RS21993, Spending Reconciliation Directives to the Senate Finance
Committee in Congressional Budget Resolutions, by Robert Keith and Bill Heniff Jr.
CRS Report RS22098, Deficit Impact of Reconciliation Legislation Enacted in 1990,
1993, and 1997, by Robert Keith.
CRS Report RS22160, Reconciliation and the Deficit in FY2006 and Through
FY2010:  Fact Sheet, by Philip D. Winters.
CRS Congressional Distribution Memorandum, January 14, 2005, Reconciliation
Directives to House Committees in Budget Resolutions for FY1976-FY2005, by Bill
Heniff Jr.
CRS Congressional Distribution Memorandum, Reconciliation Directives to Senate
Committees in Budget Resolutions for FY1976-FY2005, January 14, 2005, by Bill
Heniff Jr.
  
